

The Führer's Proclamation
to the German People and the
Note of the German Foreign Office
to the Soviet Government together
with appendices

**The Führer's Proclamation
to the German People**

People of Germany, National Socialists,

After months of grave care, throughout which I was constrained to silence, the hour has now come in which I can at last speak frankly.

When on 3 September 1939 the German Reich received Britain's declaration of war, this was a further repetition of Britain's earlier attempts to frustrate at the very outset any plan of consolidation and therefore of progress in Europe by a war directed against whatever State was the most powerful on the Continent at the time.

Thus it was that Britain ruined Spain at one time in many wars.

That was how she waged her wars on Holland.

Thus she subsequently fought France with the help of the whole of Europe.

And thus, at the beginning of the century, she commenced the encirclement of the German Reich of that time and, in 1914, the Great War.

Only through internal dissension did Germany succumb in 1918.

The consequences were terrible.

After they had declared, as true hypocrites, that they had only fought the Kaiser and his régime, they set about the systematic destruction of Germany as soon as the German Army had laid down its arms. While the prophecies of a French statesman that there were 20 million Germans too many, i. e. that this number would have to be exterminated by hunger, disease or emigration, were apparently being fulfilled to the letter, the National Socialist movement began its work of unifying the German people and preparing for the resurrection of the Reich.

Our people rose again from distress, misery and shame and their recovery bore every sign of internal renaissance.

Britain, especially, was not in any way affected or threatened thereby.

Nevertheless the new policy of the encirclement of Germany, born, as it was, of hatred, recommenced immediately. Internally and externally there resulted that plot, familiar to all of us, between Jews and democrats, Bolsheviki and reactionaries, with the sole aim of preventing the establishment of the new German national people's state, of plunging the Reich once more into powerlessness and misery.

Apart from us, the hatred of this international conspiracy was directed against those peoples, which, not favoured by Fortune, were obliged to earn their daily bread in the hardest of struggles for existence. Above all, the right of Italy and Japan to share in the goods of this world was contested just as much as that of Germany; in fact, it was formally denied. The coalition of these nations was, therefore, only an act of self-protection in the face of the threat of an egoistic world combination of wealth and power.

As early as 1936, Mr Churchill, according to the statements of the American General Wood before a committee of the American House of Representatives, declared that Germany was once more becoming too powerful and would, therefore, have to be destroyed.

In the summer of 1939 the time appeared to have come when Britain could embark upon the destruction of Germany by means of a repetition of a comprehensive policy of encirclement.

The plan of the campaign of lies staged for this purpose consisted in declaring that other peoples were threatened, in tricking them with British promises of guarantees and assistance and of making them take action against Germany just as during the Great War. In this way, Britain, from May to August 1939, succeeded in broadcasting to the world that Lithuania, Esthonia, Latvia, Finland, Bessarabia, and also the Ukraine, were being directly threatened by Germany.

A number of these states allowed themselves to be misled into accepting the promise of a guarantee proffered with these assertions, thus joining the new encirclement front directed against Germany.

In these circumstances, I considered myself entitled to assume the responsibility before my own conscience, and before the history of the German people, not only of assuring these countries or their governments of the falseness of the British assertions, but also of setting the strongest Power in the east at rest as to the limits of our interests by especially solemn declarations.

National Socialists,

At that time you probably all felt that it was a bitter and difficult step for me to take. Never did the German people harbour hostile feelings for the peoples of Russia. Yet for over 20 years the Jewish-Bolshevist rulers in Moscow endeavoured to set not only Germany, but the whole of Europe, aflame. At no time did Germany attempt to carry her National Socialist ideals and conceptions into Russia, yet the Jewish-Bolshevist rulers in Moscow unswervingly endeavoured to force their domination upon us and upon other European peoples, not only by ideological means but, above all, with military force.

The consequences of the activity of this régime were nothing but chaos, misery and starvation in all countries. I, on the other hand, have been striving for twenty years, with a minimum of intervention and without destroying our production, to arrive at a new socialist order in Germany, which would not only eliminate unemployment but would also permit the workers to receive an ever greater share of the fruits of their labour.

The success of this policy of economic and social reconstruction of our nation, which aims finally at a true people's community by systematically eliminating differences of rank and class, are unique in the entire world.

It was, therefore, only with extreme difficulty that I brought myself, in August 1939, to send my Foreign Minister to Moscow in an endeavour there to oppose the British encirclement policy against Germany. I did this only from a sense of responsibility towards the German people, but certainly in the hope after all of achieving a permanent détente and of being able to reduce the sacrifices which might otherwise have been demanded of us.

While Germany solemnly affirmed in Moscow that the territories and countries mentioned — with the exception of Lithuania — lay beyond all German political interests, a special agreement was concluded in case Britain were to succeed in inciting Poland actually to go to war with Germany. In this case too, the German claims were subject to a limitation entirely out of proportion to the capabilities of the German forces.

National Socialists,

The consequences of this treaty, which I myself had desired and which had been concluded in the interests of

the German nation, were very severe indeed, particularly for the Germans living in the countries concerned.

More than 500 000 German men and women — all of them small farmers, artisans and workmen — were forced to leave their former homeland practically overnight, in order to escape from a new régime which from the very first threatened them with boundless misery and, sooner or later, with complete extermination. Nevertheless thousands of Germans disappeared. It was impossible ever to determine their fate, let alone their whereabouts. Amongst them there were no less than 160 men of German citizenship.

To all this I remained silent because I was obliged to. For after all it was my one desire to achieve a final relief of the tension, and, if possible, a permanent settlement with that State.

However, even during our advance in Poland, the Soviet rulers suddenly, contrary to the treaty, claimed Lithuania also.

The German Reich never had the intention of occupying Lithuania, and not only did not present any such demand to the Lithuanian Government but, on the contrary, even refused the request of the Government then in power in Lithuania that German troops should be sent there for that purpose, as inconsistent with the aims of German policy.

In spite of all this, I complied with this fresh Russian demand. However, this was only the beginning of continually renewed extortions.

The victory in Poland, which was won by German troops alone, caused me to address yet another offer of peace to the Western Powers. It was refused, owing to the efforts of the international and Jewish warmongers.

Even at that time the reason for such a refusal was to be found in the fact that Britain still had hopes of being able to mobilize a European coalition against Germany, which was to include the Balkans and Soviet Russia.

Therefore the British Government* decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps as ambassador to Moscow. He received clear instructions under all circumstances to resume relations between Britain and Soviet Russia and to develop them in a pro-British direction. The British Press reported on the progress of this mission so long as tactical reasons did not impose silence upon them.

In the autumn of 1939 and in the spring of 1940 the first results actually made themselves felt. When Russia undertook to subjugate by armed force not only Finland, but also the Baltic States, she suddenly saw fit to motivate this action by the assertion, which was as ridiculous as it was false, that she had to protect these countries from an outside menace or forestall such an event. This could only be meant to apply to Germany. For no other Power could ever gain entrance into the Baltic area, let alone go to war there. Still I had to be silent. However, those in power in the Kremlin immediately went further.

Whereas, in the spring of 1940 Germany, in accordance with the so-called Pact of Friendship, had withdrawn her forces a long way from the eastern frontier and had in fact to a great extent cleared these territories entirely of German troops, the concentration of Russian forces at that time was already beginning in a measure which could only be regarded as a deliberate threat to Germany.

According to a statement which M. Molotov personally made at that time, there were 22 Russian divisions in the Baltic States alone, as early as the spring of 1940.

Since the Russian Government themselves always maintained that they were called in by the local population, the purpose of their presence in that area could therefore only be a demonstration against Germany.

While our soldiers, from 10 May 1940 onwards, had been breaking the power of France and Britain in the West, the Russian military deployment on our eastern frontier was being continued to a more and more menacing extent.

From August 1940 onwards I therefore considered it to be in the interest of the Reich no longer to permit our eastern provinces, which moreover had already been laid waste so often, to remain unprotected in the face of this tremendous concentration of Bolshevik divisions.

Thus there was produced the effect which was the object of British and Soviet Russian co-operation, namely: the compulsory maintenance of such powerful German forces in the East that a radical conclusion of the war in the West, particularly as regards aircraft, could no longer be vouched for by the German High Command.

This, however, was in line with the objects not only of British but also of Soviet-Russian policy; for both Britain and Soviet Russia intend to let this war go on for as long as possible in order to weaken the whole of Europe and render it still more helpless.

Russia's threatening attack on Rumania was also primarily for the purpose of gaining possession of an important centre, not only of Germany's, but also of Europe's, economic life, or, alternatively, at least of destroying it. The Reich, especially, since 1933 had sought with unending patience to gain the states in the south-east of Europe as trading partners. We therefore had the greatest interest in witnessing their internal constitutional consolidation and organization. Russia's advance into Rumania and Greece's connexion with Great Britain threatened to turn these regions too, within a short time, into a general theatre of war.

Contrary to our principles and customs, and at the urgent request of the then Rumanian Government, who were themselves responsible for this development, I advised acquiescence to the Soviet Russian demands for the sake of peace, intimating that Bessarabia should be ceded.

The Rumanian Government believed, however, that they could not answer for this before their own people unless Germany and Italy in compensation would at least guarantee the integrity of what still remained of Rumania.

I did so with a heavy heart. Principally because, if the German Reich gives a guarantee, then that means that it abides by it. We are neither Britons nor Jews.

I still believed at this late hour that I had served the cause of peace in that region, if only by myself assuming a serious obligation. In order, however, finally to solve these problems and to achieve clarity concerning the Russian attitude towards Germany, under the influence also of the continually increasing mobilization on our eastern frontier, I invited M. Molotov to come to Berlin.

The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs then requested Germany's clarification of or agreement to the following four questions:

1. M. Molotov's question:

Was the German guarantee for Rumania also directed against Soviet Russia in the case of an attack by Soviet Russia on Rumania?

My answer:

The German guarantee is a general one and is unconditionally binding upon us. Russia, however, had declared to us that she had no other interests in Rumania beyond Bessarabia. The occupation of Northern Bukovina had al-

ready been a violation of this assurance. I did not, therefore, think that Russia could now suddenly have more far-reaching intentions against Rumania.

2. M. Molotov's question:

Russia again felt menaced by Finland. Russia was determined not to tolerate this. Was Germany prepared not to give any aid to Finland and, above all, to withdraw the German relief troops marching through to Kirkenes?

My answer:

Germany continued to have absolutely no political interests in Finland. A fresh war waged by Russia against the small Finnish people could not, however, be regarded any longer by the German Government as tolerable, all the more so as we could never believe Russia to be threatened by Finland. But we had no desire that another theatre of war should arise in the Baltic.

3. M. Molotov's question:

Was Germany prepared to agree that Russia should give a guarantee to Bulgaria and should send Soviet Russian troops to Bulgaria for this purpose, whereas he — Molotov — wished to state that they did not intend on that account, for example, to depose the King?

My answer:

Bulgaria was a sovereign state and I had no knowledge that Bulgaria had asked Soviet Russia for any kind of guarantee as Rumania had asked Germany. Moreover, I would have to discuss the matter with my allies.

4. M. Molotov's question:

Soviet Russia required a free passage through the Dardanelles under all circumstances and for her protection also demanded the occupation of a number of important bases on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Was Germany in agreement with this or not?

My answer:

Germany was prepared at all times to agree to an alteration in the Statute of Montreux in favour of the Black Sea States. Germany was not prepared to agree to Russia's possession of bases on the Straits.

National Socialists,

Here I adopted the only attitude which I could adopt as the responsible Leader of the Reich, but also as a conscious representative of European culture and civilization.

The consequence was an increase in the Soviet Russian activity directed against the Reich, above all, however, the immediate commencement of the undermining of the new Rumanian State from within and the attempt to remove the Bulgarian Government by propaganda.

With the help of confused and immature leaders of the Rumanian Legion a *coup d'état* was staged in Rumania, the aim of which was to overthrow the Chief of State, General Antonescu, and to produce chaos in the country, so as to remove all legal power of government, and thus the *sine qua non* for the implementing of the German guarantee.

I nevertheless still believed it best to remain silent.

Immediately after the failure of this undertaking, a renewed reinforcement of the concentrations of Russian troops on Germany's eastern frontier took place. Tank units and parachutists were transferred in continually increasing numbers to a dangerous proximity to the German frontier. The German Armed Forces and the German nation know that, until a few weeks ago, not a single German tank or mechanized division was stationed on our eastern frontier.

Had any final proof been required for the coalition which had meanwhile been formed between Great Britain and Soviet Russia in spite of all diversions and camouflage, then it was provided by the Yugoslav conflict.

Whilst I made every effort to undertake a final attempt to pacify the Balkans and, in close co-operation with the Duce, invited Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact, Britain and the Soviet Union, in joint conspiracy, organized that *coup d'état* which removed in one night the Government of the time, who had been ready to come to an agreement. For we can today inform the German nation that the Serbian *putsch* against Germany did not take place merely under British, but primarily under Soviet-Russian auspices. As we remained silent on this matter also, the Soviet leaders now went still one step further. They not only organized the *putsch*, but a few days later also concluded that well-known friendly agreement with their new subservient vassals which was intended to strengthen the Serbs in their

desire to resist the pacification of the Balkans and to incite them against Germany. And this was no platonic intention:

Moscow demanded the mobilization of the Serbian Army.

Since even now I still believed it to be better not to speak, those in power in the Kremlin went still another step further:

The Government of the German Reich today possess documentary evidence which proves that Russia, in order finally to bring Serbia into the war against Germany gave her a promise to supply her via Salonika with arms, aircraft, munitions and other war material.

And this happened almost at the very moment when I myself advised the Japanese Foreign Minister, Dr. Matsuka, to ease the tension with Russia, hoping as I did thus to serve the cause of peace.

Only the rapid advance of our incomparable divisions to Skoplje, as well as the capture of Salonika itself, frustrated the aims of this Soviet-Russian-Anglo-Saxon plot. The officers of the Serbian Air Force, however, fled to Russia and were there immediately received as allies. It was the victory of the Axis Powers in the Balkans alone which in the first instance thwarted the plan to involve Germany in fighting in South-Eastern Europe lasting for months throughout the summer, while in the meantime steadily completing the concentration of the Soviet Russian Armies, and increasing their readiness for war, in order, finally, together with Britain and supported by the American supplies anticipated, to throttle and crush the German Reich and Italy.

Thus Moscow not only broke, but miserably betrayed, the stipulations of our friendly agreement. All this was done whilst the rulers in the Kremlin, exactly as they had done in the case of Finland and Rumania, up to the last moment put up a show of peace and friendship and drew up ostensibly innocent *démentis*.

Although up till now I have been forced by circumstances to keep silent again and again, the moment has now come when to continue as a mere observer would not only be a sin of omission, but a crime against the German people, and even against the whole of Europe.

Today something like 160 Russian divisions are facing our frontiers. For weeks constant violations of this frontier have been taking place, not only into our country, but from the far North down to Rumania. Russian airmen consider it a sport

simply and nonchalantly to overlook these frontiers, presumably in order to prove to us that they already feel themselves masters of these territories. In the night from 17 to 18 June, Russian reconnaissance parties again penetrated into Reich territory and could only be driven back after prolonged firing. This has brought us to the hour when it is necessary for us to take steps against this plot devised by Jewish-Anglo-Saxon warmongers and the equally Jewish rulers of the Bolshevik headquarters in Moscow.

German People,

At this very hour a movement of troops is taking place which in its extent and magnitude is the greatest that the world has ever seen. United with their Finnish comrades, the soldiers who gained the victory at Narvik are manning the shores of the Arctic Ocean. German divisions commanded by the conqueror of Norway, together with the champions of Finnish liberty, commanded by their Marshal, are protecting Finnish territory. From East Prussia down to the Carpathians there stretch the formations of the German eastern front. Along the shores of the Pruth, along the lower reaches of the Danube down to the shores of the Black Sea, German and Rumanian soldiers are united under the Rumanian Chief of State, General Antonescu.

The task of this front is thus no longer the protection of individual countries, but the safety of Europe and the salvation of us all!

I have therefore decided today to entrust the fate and the future of the German Reich and of our people once more to the hands of our soldiers.

May God our Lord aid us in this of all struggles!

22 June 1941.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Note

**addressed by the German Foreign Office
to the Soviet Government**

The Note of the German Foreign Office.

I.

When, in the summer of 1939, the Reich Government, impelled by the desire to achieve an adjustment of interests between Germany and the U.S.S.R., approached the Soviet Government, they were aware of the fact that it would be no easy matter to reach an understanding with a State which, on the one hand, claimed to belong to the community of individual nations with the rights and duties resulting therefrom, yet, on the other hand, was ruled by a party which, as a section of the Comintern, was striving to bring about the World Revolution — in other words the very dissolution of these individual nations. The German Government, putting aside their serious misgivings, occasioned by this fundamental difference between the political aims of Germany and of Soviet Russia, and by the sharp contrast between the diametrically opposed conceptions of National Socialism and Bolshevism, made the attempt. They were guided by the idea that the elimination of the possibility of war, which would result from an understanding between Germany and Russia, and the safeguarding of the vital necessities of the two peoples, between whom friendly relations had always existed, would offer the best guarantee against the further spreading of the Communist doctrines of International Jewry over Europe. This belief was strengthened by the fact that certain happenings in Russia herself, and certain measures of international scope undertaken by the Russian Government, allowed it to be assumed that a departure from these doctrines and from the former methods of causing disintegration among foreign nations appeared possible. The reception accorded in Moscow to the German *démarche*, and the readiness of the Soviet Government to conclude a pact of friendship with Germany appeared to confirm this change of attitude. Thus, on 23 August 1939, a Non-Aggression Pact was concluded, while on 28 September 1939 a Frontier and Friendship Agreement was signed by the two States. The essence of these agreements consisted in

(1) a reciprocal engagement on the part of both States not to attack one another and to live on peaceful and neighbourly terms, and

(2) a delimitation of the spheres of interest — the German Reich renouncing all influence in Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania and Bessarabia, while the territories of the former Polish State as far as the line formed by the Narew, the Bug and the San were to be incorporated in Russia according to the desire of the Soviets.

The Reich Government, in fact, immediately following the conclusion of the Non-Agression Pact with Russia, did effect a **fundamental change in their policy towards the U.S.S.R.** and from that day onwards adopted a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union. The German Government faithfully adhered, both in the letter and in the spirit, to the treaties concluded with the Soviet Union. In addition to this, they had, through the conquest of Poland, i. e., by the shedding of German blood, gained for the Soviet Union the greatest success in foreign politics which it had achieved since coming into existence. This was only possible by reason of Germany's friendly policy towards Russia and the overwhelming victories of the German forces.

Not unreasonably, the Reich Government therefore felt entitled to expect that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the German Reich would be of the same nature, especially since during the negotiations which were conducted in Moscow by Herr von Ribbentrop, the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, and also on other occasions, the Soviet Government had repeatedly expressed the view that these treaties would form the basis for a permanent adjustment of German and Soviet Russian interests, and that the two peoples, each respecting the régime of the other and prepared to abstain from any interference in the internal affairs of the other partner, would reach permanent good-neighbourly relations. Unfortunately, it was soon to become evident that the German Government had been quite mistaken in this assumption.

II.

In actual fact the Comintern resumed its activities in every sphere very soon after the conclusion of the German-Russian treaties. This was true not only of Germany herself, but also applied to states friendly to Germany, to neutral states, and to such European territory as was occupied by German troops. In order to avoid openly infringing the treaties, the methods were changed and the camouflage applied more painstakingly and with greater cunning. It

was obviously thought necessary in Moscow to counteract the effect of the conclusion of the pact with National Socialist Germany by continually pillorying Germany's alleged "imperialistic war." The strict and effective preventive measures adopted by the German police compelled the Comintern to seek to conduct their subversive activities and their intelligence work in Germany by devious routes, making use of centres established for that purpose in neighbouring countries. For this purpose former German Communist agents were employed to foment sedition and to arrange for acts of sabotage in Germany. The Ogpu Commissar, Krylov, was in charge of systematic courses of training with this object in view. Apart from this, intensive subversive activities were carried on in the territories occupied by Germany, more particularly in the Protectorate and Occupied France, but also in Norway, Holland, Belgium etc. . . .

Soviet Russian representations, notably the Consulate General in Prague, rendered valuable assistance in this connexion. An assiduous intelligence service was maintained by means of wireless transmitters and receiving stations, affording absolute proof of the activities of the Comintern directed against the German Reich. There is also comprehensive documentary evidence consisting of witnesses' statements and correspondence concerning all other subversive activity and reconnoitring carried on by the Comintern. In addition to this, sabotage groups were formed, which maintained their own laboratories for the manufacture of incendiary and high-explosive bombs for the purpose of committing acts of sabotage. Attempts of this kind were made, for example, against no less than sixteen German ships.

Espionage was another field of activity. Thus, the repatriation of the Germans from Soviet Russia was utilized for the purpose of gaining the services of these Germans for the ends of the Ogpu by the most reprehensible means. Not only men, but women too, were the victims of shameless extortion and forced to enter the service of the Ogpu. Even the Soviet Russian Embassy in Berlin, headed by M. Kobulov, Counsellor to the Embassy, did not shrink from unscrupulous abuse of the rights of extraterritoriality for espionage purposes. M. Mokhov, a member of the Russian Consulate in Prague, was at the head of another Russian espionage organization which had ramifications throughout the Protectorate. Further instances in which the police were

able to take action in good time, provided clear and unequivocal evidence of these extensive Soviet Russian machinations. The whole of the evidence proves irrefutably that Soviet Russia was engaged against Germany in political, military and economic spheres, on large-scale subversive activities, acts of sabotage and terror, and espionage in preparation for war.

As to the activities of Russia in European countries outside Germany, they extended to almost all the European States which were friendly to, or occupied by, Germany. Thus, in Rumania, for example, Communist propaganda, in the form of pamphlets of Russian origin, represented Germany as being responsible for all local troubles, in order to create an anti-German atmosphere. The same thing has been evident in Yugoslavia since the summer of 1940. The pamphlets there incited the people to protest against the Cvetković régime which was "hob-nobbing with the imperialistic governments in Berlin and Rome." At a meeting of Communist Party functionaries in Zagreb, the whole of South-Eastern Europe from Slovakia to Bulgaria was described as a Russian protectorate which would come into being after Germany's hoped-for military decline. In the Soviet Legation in Belgrade German troops discovered documentary evidence of the Soviet Russian origin of this propaganda. Whereas Communist propaganda in Yugoslavia sought to make use of nationalist catchwords, in Hungary it was effective chiefly amongst the Ruthenian population to whom it held out hopes of coming liberation through Soviet Russia. The anti-German campaign was particularly active in Slovakia where propaganda was openly carried on in favour of the annexation of the country by Soviet Russia.

In Finland the notorious "Association for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union" actively co-operated with the Petroskoi broadcasting station in attempting to bring about the disintegration of this country, and at the same time carried on activities of a marked anti-German nature.

In France, Belgium and Holland agitation was directed against the German armies of occupation. A similar campaign was conducted in the Government General, cloaked by national and panslavistic propaganda. Scarcely had Greece been occupied by German and Italian troops, than Soviet Russian propaganda commenced there too. All this is evidence of a campaign systematically carried out in every country by the U.S.S.R. against Germany's endeavour to establish a sound order in Europe.

Parallel with this there was the direct propaganda designed to counteract measures of German policy, taking the form of a denunciation of these measures as anti-Russian and attempting to win over the various countries to side with Soviet Russia against Germany. In Bulgaria there was agitation against adherence to the Tripartite Pact and in favour of a guarantee pact with Russia. In Rumania attempts were made at infiltration in the Iron Guard and at suborning its leaders, including Groza, the Rumanian who staged the *putsch* on 23 January 1941, behind whom the Bolshevik agents of Moscow stood as wirepullers. Indisputable proofs of this are held by the Reich Government.

In regard to Yugoslavia, the Reich Government has come into possession of documents according to which a Yugoslav delegate named Georgević had gained the impression from a conversation with M. Molotov in Moscow as early as May 1940 that Germany was being regarded there as the "mighty foe of tomorrow." Soviet Russia's attitude to the requests for arms made by Serbian military circles left even less doubt. In November 1940 the Chief of the Soviet Russian General Staff declared to the Yugoslav Military Attaché: "We will give you everything you ask for immediately." The prices to be paid and the mode of payment were left to the discretion of the Belgrade Government, and only one condition was made: secrecy as far as Germany was concerned. When the Cvetković Government subsequently approached the Axis Powers, Moscow began to delay the deliveries of munitions; this was briefly communicated to the Yugoslav Military Attaché in the Soviet Russian War Ministry. The staging of the Belgrade *putsch* on 27 March of this year formed the climax of these conspiracies against the Reich by Serbian plotters and Anglo-Russian agents. The Serbian leader of this *putsch* and head of the "Black Hand," M. Simić, is still today in Moscow, and is displaying there great activity against the Reich in closest co-operation with Soviet Russian propaganda offices.

The foregoing examples provide only a glimpse of the enormously varied propaganda activities which the U.S.S.R. are conducting against Germany throughout Europe. In order to furnish the outside world with a comprehensive survey of the activities of the Soviet Russian authorities in this direction since the conclusion of the pacts between Germany and Russia, and to enable the public to judge for themselves,

the Reich Government will publish the extensive material at their disposal. In general the Reich Government note the following:

At the conclusion of the pacts with Germany, the Soviet Government had repeatedly made the unequivocal declaration that they did not intend to interfere, either directly or indirectly, in German affairs. On the conclusion of the Pact of Friendship, they had solemnly stated that they would collaborate with Germany in order to bring to an end, in accordance with the true interests of all peoples, the state of war existing between Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other hand, and to achieve this aim as soon as possible. In the light of the above-mentioned facts, which have continually become more apparent during the further course of the war, these Soviet Russian agreements and declarations were revealed as being intentionally misleading and deceptive. Nor did the advantages accruing from Germany's friendly attitude cause the Soviet Government to adopt a loyal attitude towards Germany. On the contrary, the Reich Government have been forced to observe that the conclusion of the pacts in 1939 was yet another instance of the application of Lenin's thesis, as expressly reaffirmed in October 1939 in the "Instructions for the Communist Party in Slovakia," stating that "pacts may be concluded with certain other countries, if they further the interests of the Soviet Government and help to render the opponent innocuous." The conclusion of these pacts of friendship was, accordingly, for the Soviet Government only a tactical manoeuvre. Their real aim was to reach agreements which were advantageous to Russia, thus simultaneously preparing for future action. The leading idea remained the weakening of the non-Bolshevist states, in order to be in a position to undermine them more easily and, when the time came, to break them up. In a Russian document discovered after the capture of Belgrade in the Soviet Legation there this object is expressed with stark brutality in the following words: "The U.S.S.R. will not react until the opportune moment occurs. The Axis Powers have further dissipated their forces, and the U.S.S.R. will consequently strike a sudden blow against Germany." The Soviet Government have not heeded the voice of the Russian people, who sincerely wished to live in peace and friendship with the German people, but have continued with the old Bolshevik policy of duplicity and by so doing have assumed a heavy burden of responsibility.

III.

If the Soviet Union's subversive propaganda, carried out in Germany and in the rest of Europe, leaves no room for doubt as to its attitude towards Germany, then the policy of the Soviet Government towards Germany in the military sphere and in the field of foreign politics even since the conclusion of the pacts between Germany and Russia makes matters even clearer. In Moscow, on the occasion of the delimitation of the spheres of interest, the Soviet Government declared to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs that they did not intend to occupy, to bolshevize or to annex any states situated within their sphere of interest, other than the territories of the former Polish State, which were at that time in a state of disintegration. In actual fact, however, as the course of events has shown, the policy of the Soviet Union during the whole time was exclusively directed towards one object, namely, that of extending Moscow's military power wherever the possibility offered in the area between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea, and of furthering Bolshevism in Europe.

The development of this policy is marked by the following stages:—

(1) It was initiated by the conclusion of so-called Pacts of Assistance with Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania in October and November 1939, and by the establishment of military bases in those countries.

(2) The next Soviet Russian move was against Finland. When the Soviet Russian demands, the acceptance of which would have meant the end of the sovereignty of an independent Finnish State, were rejected by the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government were responsible for the formation of the Kusinen Communist puppet-government, and when the Finnish people refused to recognize this government, an ultimatum was presented to Finland, the Red Army subsequently marching in at the end of November 1939. By the Russo-Finnish Peace concluded in March, Finland was obliged to surrender a part of her south-eastern provinces, which were immediately bolshevized.

(3) A few months later, i.e., in July 1940, the Soviet Union took action against the Baltic States. Under the terms of the first Moscow Pact, Lithuania belonged to the German sphere of interest. In the second pact, at the desire

of the Soviet Union, the German Government relinquished their interests in the greater part of Lithuania in favour of the Soviet Union, for the sake of peace, although they did so with a heavy heart. A strip of this territory still remained within the German sphere of interest. Following upon an ultimatum delivered on 15 June, the whole of Lithuania, i.e. including that part of Lithuania which had remained within the German sphere of interest, was occupied by the Soviet Union without notification of the German Government so that the U.S.S.R. now extended right up to the entire eastern frontier of East Prussia. When subsequently, Germany was approached on this question, the German Government, after difficult negotiations and in order to make a further effort towards reaching a friendly settlement, ceded this part of Lithuania also to the Soviet Union.

A short time afterwards, Latvia and Esthonia were likewise occupied by military force, a procedure which constituted gross abuse of the pacts of assistance concluded with these States. Contrary to the express assurances given by Moscow, all the Baltic States were then bolshevized and summarily annexed by the Soviet Government a few weeks after their occupation. Simultaneously with the annexation, the Red Army was for the first time concentrated in force throughout the whole of the northern sector of the Soviet Russian vantage-ground directed towards Europe.

It goes almost without saying that the economic pacts between Germany and these States, which, according to the Moscow Agreements, were not to be affected, were unilaterally cancelled by the Soviet Government.

(4) In the Pacts of Moscow it had been expressly agreed, in connexion with the delimitation of interests in the former Polish territories, that no kind of political agitation was to take place beyond the frontiers marking these zones of interest, but that the activity of the occupation authorities on either side was to be restricted exclusively to the peaceful development of these territories. The German Government possess irrefutable proof that, in spite of these agreements, the Soviet Union very soon after the occupation of this territory not only permitted anti-German propaganda for consumption in the Government General of Poland, but, in point of fact, sponsored it parallel with Bolshevik propaganda in the same region.

Strong Russian garrisons were also transferred to these territories immediately after the occupation.

(5) Whilst the German army was still fighting in the west against France and Great Britain, the Soviet Union advanced in the Balkans. Although the Soviet Government had declared during the Moscow negotiations that they would never make the first move towards achieving a settlement of the Bessarabian question, the German Government were informed on 24 June 1940 by the Soviet Government that they were now resolved to settle the Bessarabian question by force. It was stated at the same time that the Soviet claims also extended to the Bukovina, that is to say to a territory which was ancient Austrian crown-land, had never belonged to Russia and had, moreover, not even been mentioned at the time of the Moscow negotiations. The German Ambassador in Moscow declared to the Soviet Government that their decision had come as a complete surprise to the German Government and that it would seriously affect Germany's economic interests in Rumania and lead to a disruption of the life of the large German settlement there, as well as of the German element in the Bukovina. M. Molotov replied that the matter was one of extreme urgency and that the Soviet Union expected to be apprised of the German Government's attitude with regard to this question within twenty-four hours. In spite of this brusque action against Rumania, the German Government once more intervened in favour of the Soviet Union in order to preserve peace and maintain their friendship with that country.

They advised the Rumanian Government, who had appealed to Germany for help, to yield, and recommended them to surrender Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Soviet Russia. The affirmative answer of the Rumanian Government was communicated to the Soviet Government by Germany together with the Rumanian Government's request to be granted sufficient time for the evacuation of these large areas and the safeguarding of the lives and property of the inhabitants. Once more, however, the Soviet Government presented an ultimatum to Rumania, and, before its expiry, began to occupy parts of the Bukovina on 28 June and, immediately after, the whole of Bessarabia as far as the Danube. These territories were also immediately annexed by the Soviet Union, bolshevized and thus literally reduced to ruin.

By occupying and bolshevizing the entire spheres of interest in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans accorded to the U.S.S.R. by the Reich Government during the Moscow

negotiations, the Soviet Government plainly and irrefutably acted contrary to the Moscow agreements. In spite of this, the Reich Government continued to maintain an absolutely loyal attitude towards the U.S.S.R. They refrained from intervention in the Finnish war and in the Baltic question, they supported the attitude of the Soviet Government against the Rumanian Government in the Bessarabian question and reconciled themselves, albeit with a heavy heart, to the state of affairs created by the Soviet Government.

Furthermore, in order to eliminate as far as possible any divergencies between the two States from the very outset, the Reich Government set to work on a large-scale resettlement scheme whereby all the Germans in the areas occupied by the U.S.S.R. were brought back to Germany. The Reich Government feel that more convincing proof of their desire to come to a lasting peace with the U.S.S.R. could scarcely be given.

IV.

As the result of Russia's advance towards the Balkans, the territorial problems in this region came up for discussion. In the summer of 1940, Rumania and Hungary appealed to Germany to effect a settlement of their territorial disputes after these divergencies, fostered by British agents, had resulted in a serious crisis at the end of August. War was imminent between Rumania and Hungary. Germany, who had repeatedly been requested by Hungary and Rumania to mediate in their quarrel, desired to maintain peace in the Balkans, and together with Italy invited the two States to a conference in Vienna, where, at their request, she proclaimed the Vienna Arbitration Award on 30 August 1940. This defined the new frontier between Hungary and Rumania, and, in order to enable the Rumanian Government to justify before their people the territorial sacrifices which they had made, and to eliminate any quarrels in this area for the future, Germany and Italy undertook to guarantee the remaining Rumanian State. As the Russian aspirations in this area had been satisfied, this guarantee could never be taken as directed against Russia. The Soviet Union nevertheless complained and stated, contrary to its former declarations, according to which its aspirations in the Balkans had been satisfied by the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, that it had further interests in Balkan

questions, though for the time being these were not further defined.

Soviet Russia's anti-German policy began from that time to become steadily more apparent. The Reich Government kept on receiving more and more definite news, according to which the negotiations which had been carried on for some time in Moscow by the British Ambassador, Cripps, were developing favourably. The Reich Government at the same time came into possession of proof of the Soviet Union's intensive military preparations in every sphere. These proofs are, among other things, confirmed by a report, recently found in Belgrade, by the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow, dated 17 December 1940, which reads literally: "According to information received from Soviet sources, the rearmament of the Air Force, tank units and artillery, in accordance with the experiences of the present war, is in full progress and will, in the main, have been completed by August 1941. This probably also constitutes the time-limit before which no appreciable changes in the Soviets' Foreign policy can be expected."

Despite the unfriendly attitude of the U.S.S.R. over the Balkan question, Germany made a fresh effort to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union: the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a letter to M. Stalin, gave a comprehensive survey of the policy of the Reich Government since the negotiations in Moscow. The letter referred in particular to the following points:— when the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan was concluded, it was unanimously agreed that this Pact was in no sense directed against the Soviet Union, but that the friendly relations of the three Powers and their treaties with the U.S.S.R. should remain completely unaffected by this Pact. This was also placed on record in the Tripartite Pact of Berlin. At the same time, the letter expressed the desire and the hope that it might prove possible jointly to clarify still further the friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. desired by the signatories to the Tripartite Pact, and to give such relations concrete form. In order to discuss these questions more fully, the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs invited M. Molotov to visit Berlin.

During M. Molotov's visit to Berlin, the Reich Government was forced to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. was only inclined towards genuinely friendly co-operation with the signatories to the Tripartite Pact, and with Germany

in particular, provided the latter were prepared to pay the price demanded by the Soviet Union. This price was to take the form of further penetration by the Soviet Union into the North and South-East of Europe. The following demands were made by M. Molotov in Berlin and in subsequent diplomatic conversations with the German Ambassador in Moscow:—

(1) The Soviet Union desired to give a guarantee to Bulgaria and, over and above this, to conclude with her a Pact of Assistance on the same lines as those concluded with the Baltic States, i.e., providing for military bases; at the same time M. Molotov declared that he did not wish to interfere with the internal régime in Bulgaria. The visit of the Russian Commissar, Sobolev, to Sofia at that time was likewise undertaken with the object of realizing this intention.

(2) The Soviet Union demanded an agreement in the form of a treaty with Turkey for the purpose of providing, on the basis of a long-term lease, a base for Soviet land and naval forces on the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles. In case Turkey should not agree to this proposal, Germany and Italy were to co-operate with Russia in diplomatic steps to be undertaken to enforce compliance with this demand. These demands aimed at the domination of the Balkans by the U.S.S.R.

(3) The Soviet Union declared that once more it felt itself threatened by Finland, and therefore demanded complete abandonment of Finland by Germany, which, in actual fact, would have amounted to the occupation of this State and the extermination of the Finnish people.

Germany naturally was unable to accept these Russian demands, designated by the Soviet Government as the primary condition for co-operation with the signatories to the Tripartite Pact. Thus the latter's efforts to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union failed. The consequence of the attitude adopted by Germany was that the U.S.S.R. now intensified a policy more and more openly directed against Germany, and that its increasingly close co-operation with Britain was clearly revealed. In January 1941 this antagonistic attitude on the part of Russia first showed in the diplomatic sphere. When, in that month, Germany adopted certain measures in Bulgaria against the

landing of British troops in Greece, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin pointed out in an official *démarche* that the Soviet Union regarded Bulgarian territory and the two Straits as a "security zone" for the U.S.S.R., and that it could not remain a passive spectator of the events taking place in these territories, which amounted to a menace for the interests of such security. For this reason the Soviet Government issued a warning with regard to the appearance of German troops on Bulgarian territory or on that of either of the Straits.

Thereupon the Reich Government furnished the Soviet Government with exhaustive information about the causes and aims of their military measures in the Balkans. They made it clear that Germany would prevent with every means in her power any attempt on the part of Britain to gain a foothold in Greece, but that she had no intention of occupying the Straits, and would respect Turkish sovereign territory. The passage of German troops through Bulgaria could not be regarded as an encroachment on the Soviet Union's security interests; on the contrary, the Reich Government believed that they were serving Soviet interests by these operations. After carrying through her operations in the Balkans, Germany would withdraw her troops from there.

Despite this declaration on the part of the Reich Government, the Soviet Government for their part published a declaration addressed to Bulgaria directly after the entry of German troops into that country, which manifested a character **clearly hostile to the German Reich**, and was to the effect that the presence of German troops in Bulgaria was not conducive to peace in the Balkans, but rather to war. The explanation of this attitude was found by the Reich Government in information received, steadily increasing in volume, about growing collaboration between Soviet Russia and Britain. Even in the face of these facts, Germany remained silent.

Along the same lines was the promise given in March 1941 that Russia would support Turkey in the event of the latter's joining in the war in the Balkans. This, according to information in the possession of the Reich Government, was the result of Anglo-Russian negotiations during the visit of the British Foreign Secretary to Ankara, who thereby aimed at drawing Russia closer and closer to the British camp.

The aggressive policy of the Soviet Government towards the German Reich, which has been steadily becoming more pronounced ever since this time, as well as the hitherto somewhat discreet political co-operation between the Soviet Union and Britain became, however, patent to the whole world on the outbreak of the Balkan crisis at the beginning of April. It is today fully established that the *putsch* instigated by Britain in Belgrade after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact was staged with the connivance of Soviet Russia. For some time, in fact since 14 November 1940, Russia had secretly assisted Yugoslavia in arming against the Axis Powers. Documents which fell into the hands of the Reich Government after the occupation of Belgrade, revealing every phase of these Russian deliveries of arms to Yugoslavia, give decisive proof of this. Once the Belgrade *putsch* had succeeded, Russia on 5 April concluded a friendly agreement with the illegal Serbian Government of General Simović, which was to lend moral support to the *putschists*, and with its weight assist the joint Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front. Evident satisfaction was expressed on this occasion by the American Under-Secretary of State, Mr Sumner Welles, when he stated on 6 April 1941, after having had several conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, that "the Russo-Yugoslav Pact might under certain circumstances be of the greatest importance; it was attracting interest in many quarters, and there were grounds for assuming that it will be more than a mere pact of friendship and non-aggression."

Thus, at the same time, when German troops were being concentrated on Rumanian and Bulgarian territory against the increasingly frequent landings of British troops in Greece, the Soviet Union, now obviously in concerted action with Britain, was attempting to stab Germany in the back, by

(1) giving Yugoslavia open political and secret military support,

(2) attempting to move Turkey to adopt an aggressive attitude towards Bulgaria and Germany by offering her support, and to concentrate her army in a very unfavourable strategic position in Thrace,

(3) itself concentrating a strong force on the Rumanian frontier in Bessarabia and on the Moldava, and

(4) the sudden attempt, early in April, of M. Vyshinskii, the Deputy People's Commissar in the Foreign Commis-

sariat, in his conversations with M. Gafencu, Rumanian Minister in Moscow, to inaugurate a policy of rapid *rapprochement* with Rumania, in order to persuade that country to break away from Germany. British diplomacy, through the intermediary of the Americans, was making efforts in the same direction in Bucharest.

According to the Anglo-Russian plan, the German troops concentrated in Rumania and Bulgaria were to have been attacked from three sides, namely, from Bessarabia, from Thrace and from the Serbo-Greek front. It was solely due to the loyalty of General Antonescu, to the realistic policy followed by the Turkish Government and, above all, to the rapid German initiative and the decisive victories of the German Army, that this Anglo-Russian plan was frustrated. According to information in the hands of the Reich Government, nearly 200 Yugoslav aircraft, carrying Soviet Russian and British agents, as well as Serbian *putschists*, led by M. Simić, were flown partly to Russia, where these officers are today serving in the Russian Army, partly to Egypt. This fact alone throws a particularly characteristic light upon the close collaboration between Britain, Russia and Yugoslavia.

In vain the Soviet Government tried on various occasions to veil the real intentions underlying their policy. Besides maintaining their economic relations with Germany even during the last stage, they adopted a succession of measures to deceive the world into thinking that they were maintaining normal and even friendly relations with Germany. Instances of this, for example, are the requests to leave they addressed a few weeks ago to the diplomatic representatives of Norway, Belgium, Greece and Yugoslavia; the silence observed by the British press about German-Russian relations, acting under the instructions of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador, who was in agreement with the Russian Government and finally, the *démenti* recently published by the TASS agency, in which the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were described as completely correct. These attempts at camouflage, which stand in such flagrant contrast to the real policy of the Soviet Government, naturally did not succeed in deceiving the Reich Government.

VI.

The anti-German policy of the Soviet Government was accompanied in the military sphere by a steadily increasing

concentration of all the available Russian armed forces on a long front extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Already at the time when Germany was heavily engaged in the west in her French campaign, and when only a few German detachments were stationed in the east, the Russian High Command began systematically to transfer large bodies of troops to the eastern frontiers with the Reich, marked mass movements being noticed along the East Prussian frontier and that of the Government General, as also in the Bukovina and Bessarabia opposite Rumania. The Russian garrisons facing Finland were continually being reinforced. The constant transfers of more and more fresh Russian divisions from the Far East and the Caucasus to Western Russia were further measures of a similar kind. After the Soviet Government had declared originally that the Baltic area, for instance, would only be occupied by very few troops, they proceeded to concentrate in this area, after military occupation had been completed, masses of additional troops, their number today being estimated at 22 divisions. It was obvious that the Russian troops were advancing ever closer to the German frontier, although no military measures had been adopted on the German side which might justify such action on the part of the U.S.S.R. It was this action on the part of the Soviet Union which first compelled the German armed forces to adopt counter-measures. The various units of the Russian Army and Air Force were concentrated closer in the direction of the frontier, and strong detachments of the Air Force were posted on the aerodromes along the German frontiers. Since the beginning of April, more and more frontier violations have also taken place and a steadily growing number of incursions over Reich territory by Russian aircraft have been observed. According to reports from the Rumanian Government, similar occurrences have been observed in the Rumanian frontier area in Bukovina and along the Moldava and Danube.

Since the beginning of the current year, the German High Command has repeatedly attracted the attention of the German Foreign Office to the steadily increasing menace which the Russian Army represents for Reich territory, emphasizing at the same time that only aggressive intentions could account for this concentration of troops. The communications received from the German High Command will be published in full detail.

If the slightest doubts about the aggressive intentions of this Russian concentration could still be entertained, they have been completely dispelled by the news which has reached the German High Command during the past few days. Now that the Russian general mobilization is complete, no less than 160 divisions are concentrated facing Germany. Observations made during the past few days have shown that the grouping of the Russian troops, and especially of the motorized and armoured units, has been carried out in such a way as to allow the Russian High Command at any moment to make an aggressive advance on the German frontier at various points. Reports about increased reconnaissance and patrol activity, as well as accounts received daily of incidents on the frontier and outpost skirmishes between the two armies, complete the picture of an extremely strained military situation which may at any moment reach the breaking point. News received today from England about the negotiations of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador, with a view to establishing still closer collaboration between the political and military leaders of Britain and of the U.S.S.R., together with the appeal made by Lord Beaverbrook, one-time enemy of the Soviet régime, to support Russia in her coming conflict by every available means, and his exhortation to the United States to do the same, show unambiguously what kind of fate it is desired to prepare for the German nation.

Summarizing the foregoing points, the Reich Government wish, therefore, to make the following declaration:—

Contrary to all the engagements which they have undertaken, and in absolute contradiction to their solemn declarations, the Soviet Government have turned against Germany:

they have

(1) not only continued, but even, since the outbreak of war, intensified, their subversive activities against Germany and Europe; they have

(2) in a continually increasing measure developed their foreign policy in a direction hostile to Germany, and they have

(3) massed their entire forces on the German frontier ready for action.

The Soviet Government have thus violated their treaties and broken their agreements with Germany. Bolshevist

Moscow's hatred of National Socialism was stronger than its political sagacity. Bolshevism is opposed to National Socialism in deadly enmity. Bolshevist Moscow is about to stab National Socialist Germany in the back while she is engaged in a struggle for her existence.

Germany has no intention of remaining inactive in the face of this grave threat to her eastern frontier. The Führer has, therefore, ordered the German forces to oppose this menace with all the might at their disposal. In the coming struggle, the German people are fully aware that they are called upon not only to defend their native land, but to save the entire civilized world from the deadly dangers of Bolshevism, and to clear the way for true social progress in Europe.

Berlin, 21 June 1941

Report

**by the German Foreign Office
on the propaganda and political agitation
of the Soviet Government**

I

The German Foreign Office is in possession of comprehensive proofs that subversive and revolutionary propaganda on a large scale with a pronounced anti-German tendency has been launched from Moscow into other countries. The old idea of a world revolution is being pursued as before. Even after the conclusion of the German-Soviet friendly agreement, Germany was placed on a par with Britain and France and continued to be regarded as a capitalistic State which must be annihilated. Pacts with Germany are merely being used as a tactical means for making the best use of a favourable political situation.

These tendencies are revealing themselves consistently in every country in the propaganda carried on by the U.S.S.R. They are particularly clearly defined in the "Directions for a campaign of organization and ideology within the Communist Party in Slovakia," issued in October 1939. These directions are based on a statement made by M. Lenin, according to which pacts may be concluded with individual capitalist countries, provided they serve the interests of the Soviet Union and create a possibility of rendering the opponent innocuous. Tactical collaboration with Germany, the directions continue, fully corresponds with these words of Lenin. The aim of the Soviet policy is outlined in the following words: "The Soviet Union and its Red Army can thereby avoid losses and hold themselves ready to attack the weakened enemy at an opportune moment in an opportune place."

The same ideas recur in pamphlets which have been spread over the most varying countries in Europe. Thus in a pamphlet printed in Switzerland, the present Soviet policy is described in another statement made by M. Lenin: "As soon as we are strong enough to strike down the whole of capitalism, we shall immediately grip it by the throat."

Papers and periodicals appearing in Moscow again and again provide world revolution slogans for the Communists in every country. Significant, for example, is a leading article in the periodical "*Internatsionalnyi Maiak*" (1941 No. 1), entitled "Lenin's cause will be victorious throughout the world," which runs as follows: "Led by our comrade Stalin, the great follower of Lenin, our country is progressing boldly and convincingly towards Communism. The international proletariat, the suppressed and impoverished masses throughout the world are repeating with convinced hopefulness the prophetic words of Lenin: 'Let the bourgeoisie rage a little longer, let them calmly murder thousands of workmen, victory is ours and the victory of the Communist world revolution is assured.'"

Further: "Under this militant revolutionary banner, the banner of the Communist *Internationale*, are united the proletarians and the workers of the whole world for the last and decisive blow against capitalism, for the victory of the socialist revolution, for Communism." (Vol. 41, No. 4.) The same tone is observed by leading personalities in Moscow, who emphasize again and again the international mission of the Soviet Union. Thus M. Molotov stated in a speech, held in December 1939: "For the international Communist movement, M. Stalin is not only the leader of Bolshevism and the leader of the U.S.S.R., but also the natural leader of world Communism"; and in an article which appeared in March 1940: "We shall remain true to the end to the trust bequeathed to us, namely, that Communism must always remain international." Stalin also said in a speech in January 1940 "We have been victorious under Lenin's flag in our battle for the October Revolution. Under the same flag we shall be victorious in the proletarian revolution throughout the world."

Hand in hand with this incitement to world revolution, we find war and armament propaganda in the Soviet Union itself, intended for home use and steadily increasing in violence. In countless speeches and proclamations, the Russian people are being summoned to military preparedness and joyfully to stake their all. Sufficient in this connection is a manifesto issued by Marshal Budennyi at the turn of the year 1940/41, in which the youth of the country is called upon never to forget "that at a moment when almost the whole globe is involved in war, Stalin's injunctions must be loyally fulfilled: the whole country must be kept in a state of tireless and constant militant and mobilized preparedness.

Daily and hourly we must occupy ourselves with the science of war, thus preparing ourselves to carry out the order to fight. We must constantly bear in mind that only a soldier who is deeply versed in the science of war can deal a death blow to the enemy." At the end of May 1941, the District Commissar Batonov wrote in the *Pravda* that it was necessary "for the Soviet Union to prepare for war day by day." Again and again the whole Soviet Press echoes the same words: "Our Red Army is an army of world revolution and the world proletariat."

These general ideas, propagated everywhere in Europe, concerning continuous work for a world revolution and military preparation for this purpose within the Soviet Union, are, in consequence of the military successes of the Axis Powers, being directed increasingly against Germany, and in individual countries are being supplemented by a concrete, steadily growing agitation against the Reich. All difficulties experienced by the various European States in their home and foreign policy are being used as arguments for this virulent campaign. In Rumania the agitation carried on by the Communists did not even decline during the first months after the conclusion of the German-Russian Friendship Pact. An official Rumanian source declared to the German Minister on 15 February 1940 that the Rumanian Communists were strongly anti-National Socialist and anti-German in their utterances and circular letters. They were not influenced in the least by the official policy followed by Moscow and Berlin. In complete accord with this statement, Communist propaganda in Rumania declared that only Germany was responsible for the difficulties experienced by that country in its home policy and for its serious economic situation. The national passions inflamed by the solution found for the Transylvanian question were exploited for agitation against the Vienna Arbitration Award, in other words, against the Reich Government. After Rumania had signed the Tripartite Pact, attempts, although fruitless, were made to stir up the population against the German troops. All this was done with the assistance of pamphlets and leaflets the lay-out and mode of printing of which betrayed the fact they came from abroad, and which, according to information supplied by competent Rumanian authorities, had been brought to Bucharest by couriers of the Soviet Legation.

In Yugoslavia, from the late summer of 1940 onwards, an anti-German orientation in Communist propaganda was also to be observed. In a circular letter sent by the admini-

strative bodies of the Drave Banat in Ljubljana to subordinate bodies on 5 August 1940, it is stated that according to information available, the Communist propaganda, in contrast to previously, was aiming at "organizing future hostile manifestations against Germany and Italy." This assertion made by the Serbian authorities was confirmed by Communist leaflets distributed particularly in Carniola. Thus, in the leaflet distributed on 23 August 1940 in connexion with the anniversary of the signing of the German-Russian Treaty, the Yugoslav Government were attacked because they had carried on a policy of *rapprochement* towards Rome and Berlin, and had attempted to make use of Yugoslavia to serve the imperialistic ends of Germany and Italy. This propaganda demanded that Yugoslavia's foreign policy should work towards *rapprochement* with Russia. A Communist leaflet distributed in Zagreb in November similarly attacks M. Maček because he had "attempted to sell the country to the Fascist Imperialists in Berlin and Rome." In a leaflet circulated in Carniola on the anniversary of the Russian revolution on 7 November 1940, a protest was demanded against the policy of trafficking with the imperialist Governments of Berlin and Rome that the Cvetković régime was carrying on. The same purpose was served by the mass demonstrations staged by the Soviets. During one of these demonstrations, when arrests happened to be made by the Yugoslav police, it was discovered that employees of the Belgrade Soviet Legation were included amongst the arrested persons.

From time to time Russian intentions to conquer the Balkans and German occupied areas were openly proclaimed in Communist circles. Thus the German Legation in Belgrade reported on 13 September 1940 that, a few weeks before, at a meeting of Communist Party functionaries in Zagreb, one of those present declared "that according to information received from Russia, the territories of Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania, as well as those portions of the Polish area now occupied by German troops, were to be described as a Russian protectorate. This new measure, however, could only be carried out after Germany, as was expected, had been weakened in the military sphere."

That such statements about Russia's future intentions against Germany were really communicated to Serbian Communists and sympathizers with the Soviets by the Russians themselves, is shown by a document found, after

Belgrade had been occupied, in the Soviet Legation there. The document summarizes in what way Russophile Serbian groups were informed by the Russians of the attitude of the Soviet Union after Rumania had linked up with the Axis Powers. This document in the Russian language, which according to its contents dates from the autumn of 1940, reads as follows:

"The U.S.S.R. will not react until the opportune moment occurs. The Axis Powers have further dissipated their forces and the U.S.S.R. will consequently strike a sudden blow against Germany. When they do so, the U.S.S.R. will cross the Carpathians, which will be the signal for a revolution in Hungary; after having passed through Hungary, the troops will proceed to Yugoslavia and press forward to the Adriatic and will then separate the Balkans and the Near East from Germany. When will this happen? At the moment which the Soviets consider most suitable for the success of this undertaking. At the same time, a revolution will break out in France.

In Yugoslavia, as the present economic situation becomes steadily worse, the masses will be more and more radicalized. If shortage of food is as great during the coming winter as the cold, Yugoslavia in the spring will be like a powder barrel needing nothing but a match."

In Bulgaria the German-Soviet Friendship Pact was interpreted by Communist propaganda as a complete capitulation on the part of Germany before the strength of Russia and, whilst Germany was reviled in the most shameful manner, the people were incited to continue their struggle against Fascism and German-Italian aggression. In Bulgarian official quarters a general intensification of Bolshevist propaganda in the South-Eastern European States was noted during the summer of 1940. In Bulgaria, too, Bolshevist propaganda attempted to use nationalist slogans. Thus in the question of the Dobruja, the moderate and responsible policy of the Bulgarian Government was branded as weak, and the support of the Soviet Union for a more drastic action was foreshadowed.

In Hungary Bolshevist propaganda could scarcely find any support, as the recollection of the reign of terror of Bela Kun was still too vivid there. All the more ruthlessly, therefore, did the Soviet Union pursue its secret propaganda in the regions with a Ruthenian minority given back to Hungary in March 1939, and allied this propaganda with annexationist

aims. Thus the Amsterdam Newspaper *Algemeen Handelsblad* reported on 30 December 1939 that Soviet stars and hammers and sickles were to be seen everywhere on the walls of those districts. Leaflets were being distributed continuously and voluminously, most probably smuggled in from Russia. These leaflets stated that Little Father Stalin, the Father of all the Russians and kindred national groups, and Brother Voroshilov, would liberate the poor suppressed Ruthenian people from their Hungarian overlords. That the Soviet Union was actually harbouring aggressive intentions against Hungary is revealed in a report from the Greek Minister in Ankara, dated 3 February 1941 and found in Athens. According to this, the Soviet Minister declared to his Greek colleague "that Hungary as yet had nothing to fear from Russia," but that he "by no means excluded such a possibility for the future."

In Slovakia propaganda was entirely based on the directions referred to above, which contained detailed instructions for the work of the Communist Party. The struggle against the Government in power was to be propagated by infiltration in the Hlinka Guard and the State trade unions. Actually, an extremely lively agitation by means of leaflets, inscriptions on walls, handbills and Communist symbols was carried on, the sharply anti-German tendency being paired with efforts openly aiming at annexation of the country by the Soviet Union. The fact that the propaganda was being directed by the Soviet Legation in Bratislava is in this case particularly clearly displayed; as the *Havas Agency* testified in March 1940, the subversive material was being printed on the premises of the Legation. Particularly intensive were the Soviet Russian machinations in Eastern Slovakia, where the confused national conditions gave an excuse for nationalist and panslav slogans.

In Sweden, the Communist Party is indeed not particularly large numerically, but it has special importance in regard to the international activity of the Comintern. As Sweden is the only country in Europe in which Communism is not forbidden, a portion of the Communist activity previously carried on in the German Ostmark, in the former Czechoslovakia, as well as in Switzerland and in France, has been transferred to Sweden. Thus, for instance, the official organ of the Comintern, *Die Rundschau*, formerly published in Bâle, is now printed in Stockholm. The main propagandist organ of the Swedish Communists is the daily paper, *Ny Dag*, which is of particular importance for the Soviet Union,

as it is now probably the only legally and regularly published Communist daily paper appearing in a neutral country in Europe. The attitude of this paper, which is financially supported by Soviet Russia, is becoming increasingly anti-German; great care is, moreover, being taken that the anti-German articles in *Ny Dag* are spread throughout the world. Thus, at the end of April 1941, this paper published an alleged manifesto of German Communist youth, in which the German measures against Yugoslavia were most violently condemned. How careful they were that this anti-German article should be read internationally, is described in the following report from the correspondent of the *New York Times* in Stockholm, dated 29 April 1941: "Today's issue of the Communist Swedish paper was sent to the British and American newspaper correspondents in a closed envelope. The manifesto to which I have referred was marked with blue pencil, as though the Swedish Section of the Communist *Internationale* attached particular value to its publication abroad. This unusual document, with its violent attack upon Hitler and his policy, contains a clear call to revolt and defeatism. It threatens disapproval on the part of Moscow. The document is generally believed here to have come from the Comintern in Moscow. Observers in Stockholm regard the manifesto as a new and impressive sign of the rapid deterioration in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany."

In Finland, Bolshevik propaganda came to a standstill during the Russo-Finnish War. After peace had been signed, the Soviet Legation in Helsingfors immediately proceeded to reconstruct the Communist Party, which at first was organized in small cells.

For actual propaganda purposes the "Association for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union" was founded, amongst the members of which — according to sentences pronounced in the Finnish Court — numerous criminal elements were found. The broadcasting station Petroskoi was erected by the Russian State Broadcasting Company in the neighbourhood of the Finnish frontier for propaganda purposes. In numerous agitatory transmissions it attempted to disturb the home political situation in Finland and to keep the Finnish Government under constant pressure. Here, too, the aim was to impair friendly relations between Finland and the Reich.

In France, the efforts of French politicians, who after the defeat of the Third Republic had endeavoured to enlist

the sympathy of the French people for a policy of collaboration with Germany and for European solidarity, were systematically obstructed by Moscow. The members of the Pétain Government were described as corrupt traitors and hirelings of small capitalistic groups. The economic and social difficulties experienced by France after her defeat were exclusively attributed to the occupation of the country by Germany. Almost every leaflet and illegal newspaper ended with a call for a Bolshevik revolution and for co-operation with Soviet Russia, which would bring about an end of all present distress.

In Belgium and Holland, too, anti-German Communist agitation with the same end in view is extremely active.

In the Government General, Soviet propaganda started directly after the demarcation of the German and Russian spheres of interest. Here it appeals in particular with panslav ideals to Polish nationalism, and attempts to represent the Soviet Union to these circles as the future liberator from German domination. On the other hand, the Russians naturally have not the slightest scruple about using Jews to falsify passports and carry news. Recently vain efforts have been made to approach German troops with agitatory subversive propaganda.

Even in Greece, according to reports from the Plenipotentiary of the Reich there, the Bolsheviks have already attempted in the few weeks which have elapsed since the German entry into that country to incite afresh the Greek people, who had been left in the lurch by Britain, against Germany and Italy. As everywhere in the occupied territories, here, too, a revolution is being prepared in the event of a Russo-German war, and linking up with the Soviet Union is proclaimed as a panacea for overcoming difficulties.

Thus Russian propaganda in every country in Europe is trying to make use of the difficulties and upheavals which the war has brought with it, in order to assist its world-revolutionary machinations. This revolutionary agitation is being bound up with steadily increasing incitement against the Reich and its attempts to create a new and stable order in Europe.

II.

The other means of political agitation employed by the Soviet Union in the above-mentioned countries are in exact accordance with the underground propaganda outlined in the

foregoing. Moscow has thus attempted again and again to obstruct Germany in her rôle of mediator in settling territorial differences between Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, and to prevent the Balkan States from joining the Tripartite Pact. The German-Italian guarantee for the new Rumanian frontiers was falsely represented by Communist agitation as an aggressive anti-Russian measure. Particularly active work was done by Moscow to prevent Bulgaria from joining the Tripartite Pact. A special delegate from the Soviet Union was sent to King Boris at the end of November 1940 to frustrate a *rapprochement* between Bulgaria and the Axis Powers, and at the same time to draw Bulgaria into the Soviet net by offering her a guarantee pact. The Russians attempted to support this mission by mobilizing the Bulgarian Communists, who had to stage mass petitions to the Government. When, a few months later, Bulgaria consented to allow German troops to enter the country, the Soviet Government, although they had received detailed information beforehand from the Reich Government about the aims and intentions of the German measures in the Balkans, converted themselves into a tool for British propaganda by asserting in an intentionally hostile public proclamation that the Bulgarian attitude would result in drawing that country into the war — an assertion which has since been sufficiently contradicted by actual facts.

In Rumania, Russian efforts since the autumn of 1940 have aimed at increasing the domestic political difficulties of the new régime in every respect, and preparing for civil war by instigating unrest. As early as November 1940, Communists and paid agents were smuggled into the Legionary Movement, and attempted to utilize internal Rumanian conflicts for the turbid aims of Moscow. The summit of the Communist agitation which had already made its appearance in November 1940 in local *putsch* schemes, especially in the oil regions, was reached in the attempted revolt of the extremist Legionaries on 23 and 24 January 1941, which, as has been incontrovertibly proved, was to a large extent due to Bolshevik agents and local Communist leaders. After the *putsch* had failed, some leaders of the revolt took refuge in the Soviet Legation in order thus to escape arrest. The German Minister in Bucharest reported, on 11 February 1941, on the background of the attempted *putsch* as follows: "The revolt was planned by Russian elements who attempted by this means to bridge the way to Bulgaria via Rumania, as well as by agents of the British Secret Service. Both immediately recognized the situation and made full use of it. Anybody

familiar with their methods is quite certain that they have had a hand in it. Their plan was to create confusion at all costs in order to bring about disorder in Rumania, a territory of economic and military importance for Germany."

Equally clear are the Russian intrigues with regard to Moscow's attitude in Yugoslavia. French documents which have been found have informed the Reich Government about remarks made in May 1940 by the Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov to the Yugoslav Delegate Georgević, which clearly show that Molotov in his talks with Yugoslavia attempted from the very first to show an anti-German attitude, whereas in talking about France and Britain he used terms "which exhibited no ill-will." In so doing, Molotov, as Georgević stated, openly indicated the possibility that Russia would oppose every Italian and German action in the Danube area. Beyond this, the Soviet Government on this occasion urged Yugoslavia to hasten her armament programme and stated that they were prepared to support this programme by supplies of arms on credit.

Georgević gained the impression in Moscow that Germany was regarded there as the adversary of tomorrow. "Germany is already the mighty foe against which Moscow is preparing itself." The Yugoslav delegate also thought himself entitled to say that Russia "was trying to delay, rather than to hasten, the deliveries promised to Germany, with every means in her power." Military quarters in Belgrade expressed a similar opinion about the Russian attitude. In one note of 24 June 1940, found in the documents of the Yugoslav General Staff, it is stated that "the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is wholly independent of that of Germany, consequently surprises, even for Germany, are not out of the question."

Russia's fundamental attitude is shown with special clarity in the matter of Russian armament supplies to Serbia, on which light is thrown by the Serbian War Office records found in Belgrade.

At the suggestion of the Soviet Government, the Serbian Minister in Moscow handed a specification of the war material required by Serbia to the assistant of M. Vishinskii, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on 14 November 1940. Only a week later, on 21 November, the Serbian Military Attaché received the answer from the Russian General Staff, "We will give you everything requested and that immediately!" The Russians became still more accommodating; still more material could be supplied and Yugoslavia could deter-

mine the prices and method of payment herself. The Yugoslav Military Attaché was in a position to report that the Russians for their part were willing "to provide war material on a large scale." The only condition made by the Russians was absolute secrecy; in particular, care should be taken to prevent Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania from learning anything of the consignment of materials. The Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow repeatedly expressed the desire that these negotiations should be carried out exclusively through military channels, as otherwise a leakage was to be feared. The military authorities were above all afraid of the Axis Powers getting to know of the intended purchases.

From this it is obvious that Yugoslav military circles realized that rearmament carried out at the instigation of Russia was a measure directed against the Axis. Russian insistence on a rapid conclusion of the negotiations was further demonstrated by the demand made by the General Staff on the following day (22 November) that detailed particulars of the type of arms required should be given by the next day. In this connexion the Russians emphasized that it was in Yugoslavia's own interest to reply at once, "Any delay would be extremely dangerous." Thereupon, the Yugoslavs sent the required specifications on 23 November. However, during weeks that followed the negotiations were held up by the Russians. At first, technical difficulties were given as the reason, but later political arguments were openly put forward. Obviously the armaments deal was to be employed in order to bring pressure to bear against the *rapprochement* then beginning between the Cvetković Government and the Axis Powers. After some weeks had passed in an attempt to remove the technical difficulties put forward as a pretext by Russia, the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow submitted a report on 4 February 1941 which reads as follows: "On 4 February the Russian War Office informed me that the negotiations concerning the supply of war materials had been delayed by the signing of our Pact with Hungary and the Commercial Treaty with Germany. These treaties are interpreted as an estrangement from Russia. This proves just as clearly as the emphatic statement that price was of no importance, that they are trying to exploit our requirements for political ends." Evidently no conclusion of these negotiations was reached under the Cvetković Government.

As is well known, the Belgrade *coup d'état* and the Simović Government were hailed with delight by the Russian wireless and the Russian press. There is no doubt that the

putschists were already encouraged in making their plans before the overthrow by hopes of Russian help. The expectations of the Simović group seemed to be fulfilled when on 5 April 1940 the Russian-Yugoslav Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow. This pact, viewed in the light of the attendant circumstances, can only be regarded as a direct provocation of Germany and an encouragement of the Simović Government's anti-German attitude. At the time it awoke a corresponding echo in the press throughout the world. The incompatibility of this treaty with the German-Russian agreements was stressed everywhere. It was looked upon as a decisive turning-point in German Soviet relations; there was even talk of the possibility of the Soviet Union entering the war against Germany! Mr Sumner Welles, American Under-Secretary of State, after several conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, commented on the Russian step as follows: "The Yugoslav-Russian Friendship Pact can under certain circumstances be of the greatest importance. The pact will arouse interest in many quarters. There are reasons for supposing that it is more than merely a Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact." That the conclusion of the Treaty was regarded by the Simović Government, too, as a challenge to enter the lists against the Reich is incontestably proved by a statement, of which documentary evidence exists, by M. Ninčić, the Minister, brother of the Foreign Minister in the *coup d'état* Government. The fact that after the outbreak of hostilities a large number of Yugoslav military planes flew to Russia to escape destruction, is further evidence of the close connexion between Simović and Soviet Russia. Furthermore, according to reliable reports, Yugoslav officers were offered employment in the service of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, documentary evidence is available that Soviet Russia supplied the Yugoslav and Greek General Staffs with information concerning the position and movements of German and Italian troops. Finally, it became known from an absolutely reliable source that on 10 April the Soviet Government proposed to the Yugoslav Minister that war material could be shipped via the Black Sea. The war material was first to be brought to Piraeus. This report shows that the Soviet Government intended to support the Yugoslav action against the Reich at any rate by means of armament supplies and thereby to stab the Reich in the back during its struggle for existence.

This entire policy is manifestly based on the political and military co-operation of the Soviet Union with Britain, and, more recently, with America too. A further indication of this co-operation is, for instance, provided by the order issued on 18 March by Mikoian, the Commissar for Foreign Trade, prohibiting the transport of war material through Soviet territory. It is quite obvious that this regulation, directed in the first place against Germany's imports from East Asia, was made exclusively in favour of Germany's adversaries. It was quite openly commented on and welcomed as such in the British and American Press.

About this time the diplomatic support given to the British Government by Russia in the Balkans also came to light. As is well known, the journey of Mr Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Istanbul was made with the object of building up a Balkan front in which Turkey was to be included, and if possible of bringing the Soviet Union into the ring as well. The way for this step was to have been paved by Mr Eden's visit to Moscow. Even if this journey came to nothing because the Soviet Union did not consider that the time was ripe formally to take sides with Germany's adversaries, Moscow was still determined to proceed in close co-operation with Britain. This was achieved by the trip to Ankara of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador, in a Russian military plane, and by the intermediary of the Soviet Ambassador there. The result of this discussion was the statement made public on 25 March 1941, in which the Soviet Union, referring to the existing Non-Aggression Pact, assured Turkey of its complete neutrality in the event of possible conflicts. The Associated Press correspondent in Ankara summed up the Soviet Union's aim in so doing as follows: "By eliminating the possibility of counter-action by Russia in the event of Turkey's entering the war on the side of Britain, Moscow is, for the first time, working openly and with weight against German diplomacy." Although the British plans for extending the war failed at that time owing to Turkey's realistic attitude, that did not alter the fact that Russia countenanced Britain's intentions. Moscow pursued the same policy with more success in the case of Yugoslavia, when, in full accord with Britain, it incited the Belgrade *putschists* to a *coup d'état* and encouraged them in their will to fight by the conclusion of the Friendship Pact. Since then the relations between the Soviet Union and Britain in the political and military spheres have become ever closer, as has been made parti-

cularly evident by the news recently received of the journey of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, to London.

Finally, there is documentary evidence proving that negotiations between Moscow and Washington are also proceeding, with the object of establishing a closer political connexion between these two States. A confidential circular, which the Soviet Minister in Bucharest addressed to a number of diplomats with whom he had close political connexions, triumphantly describes such an alliance as the greatest military and economic force in the world.

Reports

**of the German High Command to the German
Government concerning the Soviet Russian
concentration of troops against Germany**



High Command of the Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1 Op)
No. 00 110 a/41 g. Kdos.

Führer's H. Q., 13. 1. 1941

VERY SECRET

Re Soviet Russian frontier violations

To the

Foreign Office

For the attention of Ambassador Ritter

After Soviet planes had, on various occasions, during the autumn of last year flown over the demarcation line in a westerly direction at a great altitude, the High Command of the Armed Forces now reports that a foreign machine again flew far into German territory near Wojciechowice on 10. 1. 1941. Altitude approximately 3,900 feet; outline and markings allowed it to be established beyond doubt that it was a Soviet plane. The High Command of the Armed Forces will not for the time being adopt counter-measures, but has issued instructions that all further violations of the frontier are to be reported regularly.

The Foreign Office will be duly informed by the undersigned.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order Warlimont

High Command of the Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1 Op)
No. 00 369 a/41 g. Kdos.

Führer's H. Q., 1. 3. 1941

VERY SECRET

Re Soviet Russian frontier violations

To the

Foreign Office

For the attention of Ambassador Ritter

The High Command of the Armed Forces reports that in the months of January and February, not including the cases mentioned in the communication of the 13th Jan., Soviet Russian planes have again flown over the demarcation line at many places. Reports have been received more particularly from the area east of Chelm and from Ostrolenka.

As the German-Russian demarcation line in this region is especially clearly marked by the Bug, and it is consequently very easy to take bearings from the air, the High Command of the Armed Forces has now come to the conclusion that these violations of the frontier constitute deliberate acts of provocation.

In this connexion, attention is drawn to the statements by Soviet Russian officers, familiar to the Foreign Office, concerning tension between Germany and Russia, which, filled with hatred as they are, aid the anti-German propaganda conducted not only in the Russian Army but also among the Russian people.

The High Command of the Armed Forces wishes to draw attention to the seriousness of the consequences which might possibly ensue therefrom.

As hitherto the German Air Force has been instructed to refrain from any form of action whatsoever.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order J o d l

High Command of the Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1 Op)
No. 00 731 a/41 g. Kdos.

Führer's H. Q., 23. 4. 1941

VERY SECRET

Re Soviet Russian frontier violations

To the

Foreign Office

For the attention of Ambassador Ritter

Reports received almost daily concerning further violations of the frontier by Soviet Russian planes confirm the opinion of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as expressed in the communication of 1 March, that it is a question of deliberate acts of provocation on the Soviet Russian side.

On the 11th inst., two two-engined planes of the SB 2 type flew over the town of Belz at a great altitude. On the 11th inst., one plane was seen at each of the places Malkinia and Ostrów—Mazowike. A Soviet Russian plane was also reported over Langszorgen on the 14th inst. On the 15th inst., several planes flew over the demarcation line in the region Dynów—Lodzina—S. Losko. On the 17th inst., no less than 8 planes were sighted over German territory, i. e., four at both Deumenrode and Swiddern; on

the 19th inst., two planes were seen over Malkinia and another flying at 600 feet (1) over Ostrowice.

A number of other planes have also been reported, the nationality of which could not, however, be established for certain on account of the altitude. There is, however, no doubt, judging by the direction of flight and by the observations made by German units stationed there, that these violations of the frontier were also made by Soviet Russian planes.

The High Command of the Armed Forces now feels obliged to state that the flights over the frontier, which are continually increasing, henceforward will have to be looked upon in the light of systematic activity of the Soviet Russian Air Force over the territory of the Reich. Since it has become necessary in the meantime to bring up more German units as reserves on account of the reinforcements of troops beyond the German eastern frontier, the increased danger of serious frontier incidents must be envisaged.

The instructions of the High Command of the Armed Forces that no action whatsoever should be taken are, however, still in force.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order Jodl

High Command of the Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1 Op)
No. 00 805 / 41 g. Kdos.

Führer's H. Q., 6. 5. 1941

VERY SECRET

Re Soviet Russian frontier violations

To the

Foreign Office

For the attention of Ambassador Ritter

Further to the communication of 23 April, the High Command of the Armed Forces reports that violations of the frontier by Soviet Russian soldiers are now also increasing to an alarming extent.

(1) As early as the beginning of December 1940, armed officers and soldiers, who were obviously subjecting the German-Russian frontier area to systematic observation, were sighted at various points between Jaroslaw and Sokal. In some cases photographs were taken. It was not always

possible to find out for certain whether they were members of the Soviet Russian Army or officials of the Russian Customs Guard. In each case the Russians were successful in escaping in the thick undergrowth at the approach of the German frontier guards.

(2) Similar observations were recently made at Smalodarsen, Kamienczyk, Terespol and Cabuce. In the last three cases, Soviet Russian officers and soldiers crossed to the German bank of the Bug in a motor boat and afterwards examined the German frontier region with field glasses for a considerable time.

(3) With reference to the sniping experienced by Lieutenant Dallinger of the Divisional Staff, 291 Division (as already reported by telewriter), the High Command of the Armed Forces here quotes the detailed report of the High Command, 18th Army: "Lieutenant Dallinger in charge of the Topographical Section of the 291st Infantry Division, with Lance-Corporal Giessen of the Divisional Topographical Section, had been ordered to find out and to determine exactly the area visible to the Russians from the ground and from the observation towers."

"In carrying out this work in the vicinity of the frontier trench, Lieutenant Dallinger, at 16.30 hrs on 25 April 1941, was fired upon by a Russian sentry in the region to the north-east of Ramutten. Lieutenant Dallinger and Lance-Corporal Giessen immediately took cover, noted the time and the exact place and then continued their reconnaissance, at a distance, however, of more than 100 yards from the frontier. Lieutenant Dallinger immediately reported the incident to a member of the frontier patrol in the vicinity who had noticed the incident, having heard the shot."

"Lieutenant Dallinger, who was intimately acquainted with the course of the frontier, was indisputably on German territory."

"An exact sketch of the spot is attached."

The High Command of the Armed Forces is forced to conclude from these facts, together with the numerous flights across the frontier, which are continually increasing in numbers, that the Soviet Russian Army Command is systematically employing every means of reconnaissance at its disposal.

Although the orders of the High Command of the Armed Forces that no action whatsoever should be taken continue to be in force, the High Command of the Armed Forces nevertheless feels obliged to stress the fact that, from the

degree of tension actually existing, armed clashes, possibly on a large scale, might develop.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order J o d l

The Chief
of the High Command of the Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1 Op)
No. 00 886 / 41 g. Kdos.

Führer's H. Q., 11. 5. 1941

VERY SECRET

To the

Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs

Sir,

The High Command of the Armed Forces has, for some months past, and with continually growing anxiety, observed that the concentrations of Russian forces along the German eastern frontier are increasing.

According to the reports available here, there were, at the outbreak of the war in 1939, about 77 Russian infantry divisions in European Russia, of which only little more than half were stationed in the Russian frontier zone in the west. After the conclusion of the Polish campaign, this number increased to 114. Although the High Command of the Armed Forces considered this as justified, to a certain extent, by the Russian occupation of eastern Poland, even though it took place almost without fighting, the further increase of this number to 121 after the regular conclusion of these operations was regarded with all the more surprise.

Since the beginning of this year, however, reports have been coming in almost daily to the High Command of the Armed Forces from all parts of the frontier, which, when examined as a whole, made it apparent that the Russians are carrying out extensive concentrations of troops on the German eastern frontier. As the result of the wholesale withdrawal of infantry, mechanized and tank divisions from Asia and the Caucasus, in particular after the Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact on 1 May 1941, the number of infantry divisions alone in European Russia rose to 143. Of these, 119 divisions were stationed in the German-Russian frontier zone.

In the case of the tank brigades and tank divisions this increasing concentration is even more pronounced. Since the

beginning of the year, almost all the mechanized and tank divisions observed at all, are in western Russia. To these must be added 20 cavalry divisions and several battalions of parachutists.

A similar development can also be observed in the Russian Air Force. With the continually increasing concentration of light aircraft units to support the army, the rapid progress in the extension of the ground organization in the neighbourhood of the frontier points to the preparation of extensive bombing attacks on the Reich by large bomber units.

The High Command of the Armed Forces furthermore refers to the repeated statements made by high Soviet Russian officers, who at tactical exercises and manoeuvres have openly spoken of an impending Russian offensive in the near future.

The High Command of the Armed Forces, in considering these facts together with the frontier violations by Soviet Russian planes and soldiers, which have been continually reported to the Foreign Office, have come to the conclusion that the extent of the Russian troop concentrations on the German eastern frontier, which is practically the same as a mobilization, can only be interpreted as preparation for a Russian offensive on the largest scale. The danger of an armed conflict is becoming imminent.

The concentration of their armed forces, which has now been practically concluded, enables the Soviet Russian Government to have the free choice of when to begin the offensive. Corresponding German counter-measures are now imperative.

Heil Hitler!
Keitel

VERY SECRET

High Command of the Armed Forces
WFST / Abt. L (1 Op)
No. 001 096 a/41 g. Kdos.

Führer's H. Q., 8. 6, 1941

Re Soviet Russian frontier violations

To the

Foreign Office

For the attention of Ambassador Ritter

The High Command of the Armed Forces herewith encloses a detailed list of the frontier violations by Russian

planes and soldiers since the beginning of the year. It should be noted that this list is restricted to cases where the facts have been confirmed from various quarters. Mention was already made in the communication dated 23 April that a number of further frontier violations had also occurred.

Attention is, therefore, once more and with the utmost insistence drawn to the dangerous consequences of the situation on the German eastern frontier, as indicated in the communication dated 6 May.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order Jodl

1 enclosure

VERY SECRET

Berlin, 11 June 1941

High Command
Foreign, Nr. 212/41, secret,
for Dept. Chiefs

For Department Chiefs,
to be passed on by officers only.

To the Reich Government,

by the intermediary of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs

The High Command has continually kept the Reich Government informed as to the extent to which Soviet Russia's military attitude has assumed an increasingly threatening character. Whereas the political attitude of the Soviet Union was inclined to vary, and the execution of contracts in the economic sphere afforded in general no grounds for complaint, it has become clear that the military measures taken by the Soviet Union tend towards the preparation of an attack on Germany.

This development, which has led to a large-scale deployment of the Red Army from the Black Sea to the Baltic, can be outlined as follows:

At the close of 1939 and the beginning of 1940 there was no cause for anxiety in regard to Germany's eastern frontier. When Poland was liquidated the Soviet Union outwardly showed a friendly attitude. But early in 1940 it was observed with surprise that the Soviet Union had not only begun strongly to fortify their western frontier, and was preparing the now familiar "no-man's" zone along the frontier, while transferring all industry to the interior, but had also proceeded to reinforce the frontier troops in an ever-increasing measure.

On 1 September 1939 the following forces were stationed in the region west of the line Archangel—Kalinin—Poltava—western extremity of the Crimea:

- 44 infantry divisions,
- 20 cavalry divisions, and
- 3 mechanized and tank brigades.

In connexion with the Polish campaign, the Soviet Union on 28 November 1939 reinforced these troops by 47 divisions and mechanized and tank brigades to a total of:

- 76 infantry divisions,
- 21 cavalry divisions, and
- 17 mechanized and tank brigades.

In spite of the conclusion of the Polish campaign, these reinforcements were continued on a large scale. Up till 12 March 1940, at least another 16, more probably 25, divisions and mechanized brigades were added. The total strength of the Soviet Russian forces in the region of the western frontier in the middle of March 1940 was accordingly:

- 86—95 infantry divisions,
- 22 cavalry divisions, and
- 22 mechanized and tank brigades.

While, in the beginning, co-operation between the German and Soviet Russian authorities on the new frontier in former Poland apparently proceeded satisfactorily and smoothly, serious incidents occurred more and more frequently in the winter of 1939/40 (appendix 1). The incidents revealed a pronounced aversion and anti-German attitude on the part of the Soviet Russian frontier troops. This behaviour was entirely unaccountable, as the Germans openly displayed their peaceful intentions and strove to establish peaceful neighbourly relations along the frontier. Whereas violations of the frontier on the part of the Germans were mostly of minor importance and could always be proved to have been unintentional, the violations by the Soviet Russian troops were much more numerous, incomparably graver and often led to fatal results on German territory. Not until the Reich Government made strong representations did the number of frontier violations on the part of the Russians diminish, at least for a certain time.

When the Baltic States were occupied by Soviet Russia, certain agreements were reached, according to which the troops of occupation should not exceed a total strength of 70,000 men. At first, this figure was not even reached. Thus, on 28 January 1939, the strength of the army of occupation

was 53,000 men and on 1 February 1940, 57,500 men. The occupation met with no resistance; even as time went on, conditions never obtained in the occupied territories which would have made it necessary on military grounds to increase the strength of the Soviet Russian army of occupation. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, after having completely incorporated the three countries, proceeded to station in these territories an exceedingly powerful force embracing all branches of the services. In the early summer of 1940 this force had attained a total strength of approximately 250,000 men; at the present time it is estimated that 650,000 men are stationed on the territory of the former Baltic States. The concentration of powerful Russian forces on the Russian-Rumanian frontier commencing in October 1940 represented a further grave menace to Germany. When, in September 1940, at the request of the then Rumanian Government, the sending of a German military mission to Rumania was considered, and at a later date put into effect, the Government of the U.S.S.R. took advantage of this circumstance as an occasion for concentrating a number of units of the Army and the Air Force in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina on the Rumanian frontier, subsequently stationing them there permanently. The object of this step was at first to weaken German influence in the Balkans by exerting pressure on the Balkan States, and to frustrate Germany's plans in the Balkans, which she intended to carry out peacefully. Since the moment when increasingly powerful British forces began to appear in Greece, however, the object of the Russian forces concentrated on the Rumanian frontier manifestly was to intervene in the armed conflict which became inevitable after the *coup d'état* in Belgrade on 27 March 1941, and, advancing towards the west, to establish contact with the Yugoslav forces and to cut off the lines of communication serving the German forces in the Balkans. The necessary preliminaries for an attack were attended to; aerodromes were laid out near the frontier, bases were established, tank units were brought up, communications to the rear were improved, and numerous lines of advance were prepared through the mountains to the frontier. These plans were only baulked by the rapid and decisive German successes.

The years 1940 and 1941 were marked by an uninterrupted series of violations of the German frontier by the Soviet Russian Air Force. In the month of May 1941, alone, the German frontier was crossed 27 times by Soviet Russian aircraft. Violations of the frontier by Soviet Russian soldiers also re-

commenced in the beginning of 1941 and are gradually assuming intolerable proportions.

An impressive idea of the extraordinary Soviet Russian troop concentrations on the western frontier is afforded by the following summary taken from appendix 2.

1 September 1939:

- 44 infantry divisions,
- 20 cavalry divisions,
- 3 mechanized and tank brigades,
- total, about 65 divisions.

28 November 1939:

- 76 infantry divisions,
- 21 cavalry divisions,
- 17 mechanized and tank brigades,
- total, about 106 divisions.

1 May 1941:

- 118 infantry divisions,
- 20 cavalry divisions,
- 40 mechanized and tank brigades,
- total, about 158 divisions.

In view of these reinforcements of the Red Army, the High Command was obliged gradually to transfer considerable forces to the German eastern frontier. This redistribution was directly and exclusively necessitated by the threatening concentration of Soviet Russian troops.

The menace which this concentration of the Russian Army constituted for Germany corresponds to their intense anti-German spirit, which was continuously stirred up and maintained by hostile propaganda. Innumerable reports from friendly and neutral observers confirm this.

From Appendix 2, section VI, it will be seen that the concentration of the Red Army must in general be regarded as complete. For of a total of

- 170 infantry divisions,
- 33½ cavalry divisions,
- 46 mechanized and tank brigades,

the following are stationed in the western frontier territory:

- 118 infantry divisions,
- 20 cavalry divisions,
- 40 mechanized and tank brigades.

In the remainder of Russia in Europe only

- 27 infantry divisions,
- 5½ cavalry divisions,
- 1 mechanized and tank brigade,

and in the Far East no more than
 25 infantry divisions,
 8 cavalry divisions,
 5 mechanized and tank brigades
 remain.

From these figures it is evident that the Russian forces have been concentrated nearer and nearer to the frontier. The various units of the Army and the Air Force have closed up towards the front; aerodromes along the frontier have been occupied by powerful Air Force units. Reconnaissance activity has increased in a marked measure, very high officers with large staffs occasionally taking an active part.

All these facts, combined with the hostile and destructive feelings towards Germany with which the Russian forces are imbued, inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is preparing to deliver an attack on the Reich at the moment which appears to them to be propitious.

The Chief of the High Command
 (signed) Keitel

Summary of frontier violations by Russian aircraft and Russian soldiers

No.	Date	Place	Remarks
1	10th Jan.	Wojciechowice	Presumably Russian, 1100 yards into German territory
2	4th Apl.	Belz	
3	4th Apl.	Belz	10,000 —13,000 ft altitude, 2-engine, presumably type S B 2
4	11th Apl.	Malkinia	Remained ½ hour over German territory
5	11th Apl.	Ostrów-Mazowie	10,000 ft altitude
6	14th Apl.	Langszorgen	2-engined Russian plane
7	15th Apl.	Dynów—Lodzina — S. of Losko	Several aircraft passed over frontier
8	17th Apl.	Deumenrode	4 aircraft
9	17th Apl.	Swiddern	4 single-engined monoplanes, circling over Swiddern at altitude of 3300 ft
10	19th Apl.	Malkinia	Type I 16 Rada; wide sweep over Bug bridge
11	19th Apl.	Malkinia	Over Malkinia, from east to west
12	19th Apl.	Ostrowice	650 ft altitude, heading for Baczi, no markings
13	26th Apl.	Suwalki	5 Russians with vehicle; 1 second lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 2 N.C.O.s, 1 man, armed with sub-machine guns

No.	Date	Place	Remarks
14	16th Apl.	Kamienczyk	Motor boat with 6 persons; it is presumed that photographs were taken
15	26th Apl.	Smalodarsen	2 armed Russian soldiers who observed ground
16	27th Apl.	Terespol	Motor boat with 7 men; officers searched German frontier territory
17	27th Apl.	Cabuce	Motor boat moored on German bank of the Bug
18	7th May	Turan	Single-engined monoplane
19	9th May	Lyck	Two-engined plane
20	9th May	Korzew	Marking could not be made out distinctly
21	9th May	Saranaki	Russian biplane at altitude of 100 ft
22	9th May	Radeby	1 ³ / ₄ —2 ¹ / ₂ miles over German territory
23	10th May	Saranaki	Circled 15 minutes over German territory, photographs probably taken
24	10th May	Granne	3 planes, altitude 5000 ft
25	10th May	Wieska	Flight over German territory from easterly direction
26	10th May	Mogielnica	1 plane of Russian nationality
27	19th May	Drugén	2 single-engined planes, circled twice over Labour Service Camp
28	21st May	Grajewo	Single-engined low-wing monoplane at altitude of 3300 ft
29	24th May	Ugniewo (3 m. E. of Ostrów)	3 biplanes
30	24th May	Gezjmki- Pozewo	1 Russian reconnaissance plane (4000 to 5000 ft altitude)
31	24th May	Ostrów-Mez	probably same machine as No. 30
32	26th May	Ostrów-Maz Zambrów	2 Russian planes, single-engined low-wing monoplanes, with distinct Soviet nationality marking
33	26th May	Zamość	1 Russian monoplane
34	26th May	Wojciechowice Ostrolenka Zamość	1 land plane (monoplane) altitude about 2600 ft, the Soviet Russian nationality marking, the Red Star, was observed
35	26th May	Narew-Baw (11.40hrs)	1 Russian single-seater fighter (I 16) at altitude of 6500 ft, flew over barracks, Woyiece, Kowo, Ostrolenka railway station
36	26th May	Rożan	1 single-engined plane at altitude of 5000 ft

No.	Date	Place	Remarks
37	26th May	Lubicjewo (12.01hrs)	1 Russian single-seater fighter (I 16) at low altitude in direction of Komorewo camp probably same machine as in No. 34
38	2nd June	Wiszniz	1 plane (about 13 000 ft altitude), south-east of Biała — Podlaski — Łomazy
39	2nd June	Nittken (9½ miles S. E. of Larys)	1 plane at altitude of about 26,000 to 30,000 ft
40	5th June	Sarnaki	1 Russian plane coming from north crossed the Bug at great altitude in direction of Sarnaki (14 miles N.E. of Biała — Podlaski)
41	6th June	Goworowo	2 Russian biplanes, probably R 5 or R Z at 1650 ft altitude over Goworowo — Ostro — Maz — Ukliewo

High Command
WF St/Abt. L (I Op)
No. 001161/41 g.K.

Berlin, 20 June 1941

VERY SECRET

Re Soviet Russian frontier violations

To the

Foreign Office

For the attention of Ambassador Ritter

On 17 June, at 8.25 hrs., armed Russian soldiers crossed the Russian frontier in the sector occupied by the VI German Army Corps east of the Rominten Moors, near Ejszeryszki (9½ miles west of Kalwaria), and proceeded cautiously on German territory. When German sentries fired on the Russian soldiers, they took cover. After a brief exchange of shots the Russians then withdrew to their own territory.

This occurrence, in conjunction with the concentration of Soviet Russian forces, which is particularly strong opposite East Prussia, is a further indication of Soviet Russia's provocative intentions.

Since 11 June, 20 infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions and 5 tank brigades have been definitely ascertained opposite the section of the frontier from Suwalki—Memel alone.

In the curve round Białystok, which projects far to the west, 19 infantry divisions, 7 cavalry divisions, 1 tank division and 5 tank brigades are concentrated.

Behind there, round Baranowiczy, a reserve army of 10 infantry divisions and 2 tank brigades is assembled.

From this it is clear that at any moment a tremendous Soviet Russian force which is divided into 4 armies and embraces

49 infantry divisions, including numerous mechanized divisions,

3 tank divisions,

12 tank brigades and

7 cavalry divisions,

can commence to move, from the east and south-east, towards East Prussia and the country round the mouths of the Bug and the Narew north of Warsaw.

Such an attack can, according to the information available in regard to the aircraft stationed on the Soviet Russian aerodromes north of the Pripet Marshes, be supported by nearly 2000 planes.

It was explained in detail to the German Foreign Office as early as 11 May that Soviet Russian forces were similarly concentrated on all the rest of the Eastern front, though not to such a pronounced degree. In the last few weeks the situation regarding the concentration of Soviet troops has only changed inasmuch as in South Bessarabia exclusively mobile forces (tank divisions and brigades as well as mechanized and cavalry divisions) are assembled, which definitely points to aggressive intentions.

In conclusion, the High Command must observe that military measures of such a kind adopted towards a State with which a Friendship Pact exists must be characterized as extremely remarkable.

There can be no doubt but that for months Soviet Russia has regarded this pact simply as a safeguard enabling her to carry out with as little disturbance as possible the greatest military concentration in her history directed against Germany in Britain's interests.

The security of the Reich renders it necessary to remove this threat without delay.

The Chief of the High Command

By Order

(signed) Jodl

Frontier incidents — winter 1939/40

- 25 Dec. 1939: near Mrzygłód: shots fired on German frontier customs guard when a Russian, liable to military service, was arrested.
- 9 Jan. 1940: Kuzawka: German customs official fired on.
- 15 Jan. 1940: Gluchów: fugitive who was on German territory shot.
- 26 Jan. 1940: Danilowo: German customs patrol fired on.
- 30 Dec. 1939: Wolka-Nadburzna: woman coming from U.S.S.R. shot on German territory.
- 19 Dec. 1939: Sokołów: fugitives fired on by Russian sentries with tracer bullets falling on German territory 330 yards from frontier.
- 6 Jan. 1940: Rayskle-San: a Ukrainian fired on 120 yards from frontier.
- 8 Jan. 1940: Koytniki-San: 1 fugitive shot on German territory. 1 severely wounded.
- 7 Jan. 1940: Ostrów-San: 2 Chinese pedlars shot.
- 27 Jan. 1940: Kankowo:
1. 2 Russian frontier guards fired on and killed an unknown frontier inhabitant, who was on German territory.
 2. A Russian frontier guard crossed the frontier line and carried off a young frontier inhabitant.
- 1 Feb. 1940: Ugniewo: customs office reported German customs guards fired on by Russian frontier troops.
- 2 Feb. 1940: Sokal: Russian frontier guard shot a fugitive on German territory, also a woman (Swistawski).
- 23 Feb. 1940: Przemyśl: on illegally crossing the frontier a woman was shot at from the Russian side. 10 shots were fired and she was wounded in the upper thigh.
- 13 Feb. 1940: Sokal: Jew shot on German territory by Russian frontier guard.
- 8 March 1940: Sokal: 2 frontier inhabitants shot at on German territory. 1 killed.

Comparative table showing the Red Army reinforcements since 1 Sept. 1939

	Strength	In western frontier region*			Rest of Russia in Europe			Far East			Total			Remarks
	Inf. div.	Cav. div.	Tank and mech. brig.	Inf. div.	Cav. div.	Tank and mech. brig.	Inf. div.	Cav. div.	Tank and mech. brig.	Inf. div.	Cav. div.	Tank and mech. brig.		
I	1.9.39	44 (2 mech.)	20	3**	33	4½	1**	28 (1 mech.)	8½	1**	105 (3 mech.)	33	5**	Beginning of war
II	28.11.39	76	21	17	38	4	7	36	8	7	150	33	31	
	Changes compared with 1.9.39	+32	+1	+14	+5	-½	+6	+8	-½	+6	+45	-	+26	After Polish Campaign and march into Baltic States before start of Finnish War
III	12.3.40	86-95	22	22	26-31	4	3	34	7	7	146-160	33	32	
	Changes compared with 28.11.39	+10 to +19	+1	+5	-12 to -7	-	-4	-2	-1	-	-4 to +10	-	+1	End of Finnish War
IV	1.8.40	83	18	24	34	6	4	34	9	8	151	33	36	
	Changes compared with 12.3.40	-3 to -12	-4	+2	+8 to +3	+2	-1	-	+2	+1	+5 to -9	-	+4	After occupation of former Rumanian districts
V	1.1.41	92	20	29	29	5	2	29	7	5	150	32	36	
	Changes compared with 1.8.40	+9	+2	+5	-5	-1	-2	-5	-2	-3	-1	-1	-	
VI	1.5.41	118	20	40	27	5½	1	25	8	5	170	33½	46	
	Changes compared with 1.1.41	+26	-	+11***	-2	+½	-1	-4	+1	-	+20	+1½	+10***	

* West of line: Archangel
Kalinin
Poltava
Western extremity
of Crimea

** Tank corps, how many
brigades not known

*** Including
5 tank divisions

Report

**by the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich
Chief of the SS and Chief of the German Police
to the Reich Government
concerning the subversive activities of the
U.S.S.R. directed against Germany and National
Socialism**

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Berlin, 20 June 1941

We submit herewith a report by the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service dated 10 June 1941 concerning subversive activities by the U.S.S.R. directed against Germany and National Socialism.

The Reich Minister of the
Interior
(signed) Frick

The Reich Chief of the
SS and Chief of the
German Police
(signed) Himmler

To the

Reich Government

through the intermediary of

the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
Berlin

The Chief of the Security Police
and the Security Service
IV E L 17/41 gRS

Berlin, 10 June 1941

Secret Reich Communication

Report to the Reich Chief of the SS and Chief of the German Police.

The subversive activity carried on by the Communist *Internationale* against the Axis Powers and especially against National Socialist Germany up to the conclusion of the German-Soviet Consultation and Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 is a matter of common knowledge.

The hope that after the conclusion of this Pact Soviet Russia would act in good faith in accordance with the terms of the agreement and cease her inflammatory activities against the German Reich, was unfounded. On the contrary, Communist subversive activities, attempted acts of sabotage and terror and a maximum speeding up in the development of their military, economic and political Intelligence Service were the fixed, but recognizable, aims of the Soviet Russian leaders.

The only thing they altered was their method which, owing to its ever-changing style and subtle camouflage, continually presented our police with fresh problems.

I. Construction and Aims of the Comintern.

The Communist *Internationale* (Comintern) is a Soviet Russian organization (having its headquarters in Moscow), the aim of which is (§ 1 of the Statute): "to unite the Communist Parties of all countries in a universal party and to fight for the conversion of the working classes and for the principles of Communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Even today, Stalin, as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a member of the Board of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The same applies to Molotov, to Pieck, a German emigrant and representative of the German section of the Communist *Internationale*, Thorez, the French Communist Leader, and Dimitrov, the Bulgarian terrorist, who gained notoriety as being implicated in the Reichstag fire and who is their Chairman.)

In official circles in the Soviet Union the Comintern represents an independent and unofficial, that is to say, a non-state machine, which can be used for the purpose of carrying out any subversive activity on an international scale. Apart from special intelligence services and espionage the Comintern is, however, utilized for the accomplishment of special tasks abroad, thus rendering exact differentiation in counteracting its activities extremely difficult.

Especially since the outbreak of the war the disruptive work of the Comintern has been intensified by the employment of huge numbers of men and vast sums of money. All Europe was flooded with proclamations and instructions issued to the various national sections with the object of inciting adherents to the Communist ideology to devote their entire energy to unremitting subversive activity against "Germany's Imperialistic War," one of the main objects being to neutralize by this increased activity the detrimental effects which the conclusion of the pact with National Socialist Germany was assumed to have on the Soviet Union.

II. The new Method employed in carrying out illegal subversive Activities.

1. Against the Reich.

Owing to the relentless struggle against, and the extermination of, the Communist Party from 1933 onwards, which was a necessary consequence of the uncompromising attitude of the National Socialist Party, not only had the most strenuous efforts of the Comintern working abroad been in vain, but the controlled activities of small residuary sections of the Communist Party and its AM and BB groups (AM =

Military Political Section, and BB = Industrial Espionage), had also proved useless during the period preceding the conclusion of the pact.

The Comintern replied to the increased pressure exerted by the Police Preventive Authorities by issuing methodical instructions concerning more subtle tactics with regard to subversive activities. Following the example of the Trojan Horse, more was to be done from within, as in the typical case of the Spanish Civil War. Through the conclusion of the pact on 23 August 1939, this procedure was deprived of any propaganda value, a fact which the Executive Committee of the Comintern wished to counterbalance by increased activity with a view to rebuilding comprehensive AM and BB machinery. Whereas the work of the Comintern proved easier in the occupied territories owing to the fact that efficient collecting centres of the Communist Parties themselves were still in existence, its efforts directed against the Reich never got beyond the preliminary stage, thanks to timely intervention.

It was established on the grounds of continued observation that the liaison centres of the Comintern had once again been systematically extended throughout the countries of Europe with the sole object of intensifying subversive activity and intelligence service within Germany.

Thus, one of the main liaison centres is that of the Swedish Communist Party in Stockholm. It is one of the Comintern's busiest and most dangerous centres of activity. The methods adopted by it against the Reich will be described in greater detail below on the basis of the abundant material available.

Activity directed against the Reich was mainly entrusted to former leading German Communist agents who had been trained for many years in Moscow and in other European cities. Their infiltration into the Reich began in the year 1939. One of the most wily of these succeeded in establishing contact on a far-reaching scale with fellow-partisans with whom he had formerly been acquainted and by dint of systematic effort he re-established Communist cells in large factories in Berlin in which work of military importance was being executed. The unswerving object of this activity was not only to spread sedition amongst the employees but also to encourage them to perform acts of sabotage and at the same time to carry out industrial espionage. By skilfully planned courier routes material, instructions and money were continually received from the Comintern instructors in

Stockholm and Copenhagen. A member of the Swedish Riksdag, of the name of Linderoth, who is the Stockholm representative of the European Office of the Comintern, played a leading part in planning this organization, which assumed dangerous proportions.

He executed special commissions with which he was entrusted by the Executive Committee of the Communist *Internationale* for the various countries. From Stockholm, Linderoth enlisted the services of direct agents of the Comintern in Copenhagen to work against the Reich. They were also financed by him. In order that leading agents (such as Arthur Emmerlich, born 20 Sept. 1907 in Niederwiesia; Willy Gall, born 3 Oct. 1908 in Falkenstein/Vogtland; Rudolf Hallmeyer, born 3 Feb. 1908 in Plauen, and Heinrich Schmeer, born 20 March 1906) might be protected as far as possible against intervention on the part of the Security Service (SD), they received instructions from Linderoth's agents on the methods which, it was assumed, would be used by the Police. This course of instruction was arranged by Dmitri Fedoseevich Krylov, an OGPU commissar, who is very well known here. (Since 3 Feb. 1941 the OGPU has become a section of the United People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs under the style of "The People's Commissariat for National Security").

The organization developed by the above-mentioned leading agents operated through a courier centre which had in the meantime been duly established in Hamburg, and which communicated with Moscow via Copenhagen and Stockholm, its purpose being to supply, in return for money and in accordance with instructions, vital information concerning the rate of manufacture and production of the newest kinds of armaments in Germany.

Apart from these tasks it was the duty of the organization to arrange for the continuous issue of seditious leaflets. The last instructions to reach Emmerlich from the Comintern in Moscow (dated end of May 1941) provided striking proof that plans had been made and were actually being carried out for the sending of a large number of additional instructors during the next two months to be distributed throughout the various districts of the Reich.

Since, owing to the size of the organization, those whose duty it was to observe its activities were no longer in a position to prevent actual damage from being done, they intervened at the end of May 1941 and arrested all those concerned.

2. Against the territories occupied by Germany.

The technique of subversive activity carried out by the Comintern in the territories occupied by Germany took a form similar to that described above: —

a) In the Protectorate

Even before the occupation of the former Czechoslovak territory the Communist Party was very active, but it was particularly after the establishment of the Protectorate that its illegal activities attained their full height. In recent years Communist agents were continually being summoned from that country to attend the Lenin School in Moscow, where they received a course of military and political training in the theory and practice of civil war and terrorism.

These qualified agents were employed after the establishment of the Protectorate. They at once began with the construction and development of the illegal German Communist Party.

Contact with the Comintern was maintained and the supervision and organization of Party activities were carried out through the Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. in Prague. Kurt Beer, a Jew, TASS correspondent and press reporter at the Soviet Russian Consulate General, acted as liaison officer for the Soviet Russian Consulate General. In the execution of his duties he received from the diplomatic representatives Russian newspapers and Communist propaganda material, which he, in accordance with his instructions, handed over to the chief agents of the German Communist Party. He also handed out large sums of money to be expended for the carrying on of illegal activity by the Party.

In addition to this means of communication through the Soviet Russian Consulate General, the Comintern in the Protectorate had direct wireless communication with Moscow. The agents who were entrusted with the management of the Comintern's secret broadcasting station in Prague had also received a special course of training at the school of wireless telegraphy in Moscow. (This school is supervised by the Comintern and watched over by the Red Army.) The courses are organized on a very broad basis and are designated as "OMS", i. e., *Organizatsiia Mezhdunarodnogo Soedineniia* (Organization of International Connexions).

The wireless system in Prague, which was functioning until a few days ago, consisted of a big transmitting and receiving apparatus.

By means of wireless, reports were sent from Prague concerning the general political situation within the country, the conduct and success of the activities carried out by the Party, the meetings of all those in charge in this centre and the resolutions passed at such meetings, and also the situation, morale and activity of the Party. Similarly, orders and instructions were received from the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Moscow. The wireless transmissions from both sides which we have secured provide incontrovertible proof of the unyielding revolutionary aims of the Comintern directed at destroying National Socialism.

b) In the occupied territory in France.

The Comintern also paid particular attention to the French Communist Party, especially as in Lenin's opinion France was destined to become the Bolshevik bulwark in Western Europe. In view of the present internal weakness and disintegration of France the Communist *Internationale*, which, before the war, had a large number of adherents, hoped to score a success.

Here, too, we have obtained irrefutable evidence that the Communists in France were provided with money and means of propaganda in every form by the diplomatic representatives of the Soviet Union.

Here, too, the pact of 23 August 1939 played no part, or at least only in so far as from that time onwards the anti-German activity of French Communists was intensified by indirect means. The most striking and at the same time the most direct proof of this is supplied by a document found in Paris in the course of a search conducted at the *Sûreté Nationale* (the French Secret Police) concerning the French daily newspaper *L'Ordre*. Authentic documents of the French police provide evidence that, apart from Vutsević who was in charge of the press department of the Yugoslav Legation and Jaques Ebstein, who was the lover of Lady Stanley, Lord Derby's sister, a Czech Jew named Otto Katz, alias Karl Simon, who was in the pay of Soviet Russia, was in November 1939 actively concerned in putting this paper on a sound financial basis. In November 1939 M. Surits, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, accompanied by the former Spanish Communist Minister, Señor Negrin, and in January and February 1940 by M. Biriukov, Secretary to the Embassy, had visited the chief editor of the newspaper, M. Buré, at his villa in Saint Cloud. On this occasion it was decided that a certain Etevenont should be employed as official agent of

the Soviet Russian Embassy on the managerial staff of the newspaper *L'Ordre*. The sum granted for this purpose was increased at the end of March to 800,000 francs per month. After the dissolution of their Party in France, the Communist Leaders were given express orders to instruct their followers to read *L'Ordre* as a reliable anti-German paper.

c) In the other occupied territories.

In Norway, too, the Soviet Legation in Oslo was the centre of the Comintern's disruptive propaganda. Here we succeeded in surprising members of the Legation in the very act of carrying out this work.

In Holland, Belgium and in the former Yugoslav State, proof was obtained that the same methods were used as against the German Reich.

We should far exceed the limits of this short report if we were to deal at full length with the abundant documentary evidence consisting of witnesses' statements and written proof available concerning the subversive activities and espionage carried out by the Comintern.

It is important to stress the fact, which is constantly confirmed, that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Reich and the territories occupied by it was insincere and that since 1940 the subversive activity of the Comintern has increased with feverish zeal.

III. Sabotage by the Comintern.

Some ten years before the outbreak of war the Comintern began to order seasoned Communists of all sections to Soviet Russia, and to instruct them in various training centres, sabotage and the science of explosives forming the main subjects. Since 1930 the so-called politico-military training courses in Moscow were resumed with particular intensity and have been continued ever since. As the Comintern always reckoned on the possibility of military conflict occurring in the realization of their efforts to attain world power, they issued instructions at their World Congresses, which plainly incited their supporters to perform acts of terrorization and sabotage and which represented such acts of violence as a political necessity.

The large number of terrorist and sabotage groups discovered by the Security Police (S.D.) in the Reich, which had been established at the orders of the Comintern, is characteristic of the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards the Reich. Acts of sabotage on objects of military

importance such as bridges, the blowing-up of important main railway lines and the destruction and crippling of important industrial works were the means chosen by these purely Communist groups, which did not hesitate to destroy human life in carrying out their actions. Besides orders to carry out acts of sabotage, the perpetrators also received instructions regarding attempts to be made on the life of prominent persons in the Reich.

Although it might have been presumed that the series of crimes of violence carried out, or still in the course of preparation, by the Comintern would come to an end with the conclusion of the Consultation and Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and Russia on 23 August 1939, detailed investigations, which were also carried out in the territories occupied by Germany, have provided proof that the Comintern had no intention of ceasing their criminal activities against the Reich.

Besides the groups formed on the instructions of the British Secret Service for carrying out acts of sabotage on shipping, whose aim already in peace-time had been the destruction of German vessels, there existed another terrorist organization of the Comintern with far wider ramifications, the principal task of which was the destruction of the ships of those States which used to form the Anti-Comintern bloc.

Proof exists that members of this organization were active until the end of 1940 and were attempting from Denmark to resume their operations in the Reich. The leader of this organization was the German *émigré*

Ernst Wollweber,

who in 1931 had been a prominent figure in the Red German Trade Union Opposition and who had been elected to the Reichstag in November 1932 as a deputy of the German Communist Party. After emigrating to Copenhagen in 1933, Wollweber assumed leadership of the Seamen's and Dockers' International, which professional international organization is responsible for the acts of sabotage ordered by the Comintern, especially against German vessels. The organization and active employment of the sabotage groups formed on instructions from Moscow in Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France and the former Baltic States was chiefly his work. He exercised a far-reaching control over the supply and transport of explosives and other materials for the purpose of sabotage, and had at his disposal the large sums of money provided by the

Comintern for financing the organization and paying the agents. When the German troops entered Oslo in May 1940, Wollweber fled to Sweden where he is still under arrest in Stockholm. The Soviet Government has approached the Swedish Government to secure his extradition to Soviet Russia, particularly since he has in the meantime been awarded Soviet Russian nationality for his successful work for the Comintern.

Successive acts of sabotage on 16 German, 3 Italian, and 2 Japanese vessels, resulting in two cases in the total loss of valuable ships, were due to the activities of this group of Communist terrorists, which had spread over the whole of Europe. Whilst the terrorists at first attempted to destroy the ships by setting fire to them, they recently, when this method in most cases did not result in the total loss of the ships, began to carry out attacks by means of explosives upon the ships plying in the Baltic and the North Sea. Their chief centres were situated in the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Danzig, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Oslo, Revel, and Riga.

The Communist sabotage groups formed in Holland, Belgium and France were led by the Dutch Communist

Josef Rimbartus Sch a a p ,

who was the leader of the Inter-Club in Rotterdam and was closely connected with the principal officials of the head organization in Scandinavia. His second-in-command was the former Organization Chief of the Red Ex-Service-Men's Association in Hamburg

Karl B a r g s t ä d t ,

who was responsible to the head organization for the technical details of the sabotage acts with explosives. The necessary explosives came from ore mines in Northern Scandinavia and were conveyed to the Communist sabotage groups in Holland, Belgium and France by Dutch sailors via the Norwegian ore harbour of Narvik and the Swedish ore harbour of Luleå. One of the most prominent conveyors of explosives, the Dutch Communist

Willem van V r e e s w i j k ,

was arrested in Rotterdam.

Both the Dutch and Belgian groups had a number of laboratories in which they manufactured incendiary and explosive bombs. The acts of sabotage carried out on the Italian steamer "Boccaccio" and the Japanese steamer "Kasij Maru" must be attributed to the activities of these groups. Acts of sabotage planned against German ships in the harbours of

Amsterdam and Rotterdam were discovered in due time and prevented.

During the course of further investigations, the Security Police (S.D.) were able to arrest 24 Communist terrorists, among whom were the leader of the Dutch sabotage group

Achille Beguin,

and the leader of the Belgian sabotage group

Alfons Fictels.

The Danish police were able to arrest Schaap himself in Copenhagen on 1 July 1940, while he was preparing to get the shipping sabotage organization already existing in Denmark under way again.

To what extent the Comintern is striving to annihilate German shipping in the Baltic by means of sabotage is apparent from the fact that in the months between February and April 1941, the Security Police (S.D.) in collaboration with the Danish police, succeeded in arresting prominent officials of the Communist Party in Denmark who had been aiding Communist sabotage groups and taking an active part themselves. They include

Richard Jensen,

a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Denmark, and General Secretary of the Seamen's and Dockers' International,

Thøger Thøgersen,

the editor of the Danish Communist paper "*Arbejderbladet*" in Copenhagen, and

Otto Melchior,

a half-Jew and a member of the Committee of the Danish Union of the Friends of Soviet Russia.

The Communist sabotage group in Denmark is directly responsible for the attempts made on the German steamer "Saar" in the harbour of Revel and the German cargo-boat "Phila" in the harbour of Königsberg, where in the latter case a violent explosion caused a large hole forward on a level with the water-line. The chemical time-explosive was put on board at Riga.

Chemical and mechanical incendiary explosives and fuses used by the Danish Communist organization came from Sweden, and were always taken to Copenhagen by special messenger from a men's outfitter's business in Malmö where they were stored.

Highly important indications regarding the work of the Comintern against Germany have been gathered from the statements made by other Communist terrorists in Denmark.

The Comintern, it appears, made particular efforts to procure Scandinavian seamen as collaborators, as it was thought that only the Scandinavian States would remain neutral in a coming war and that only nationals of those states would then be able to carry out acts of terrorization in German ports and on German ships. Urgent instructions were, moreover, given that the cargoes of their own ships should be destroyed by fire and explosions if this served the interests of the Soviet Union. Wollweber himself had instructed the various sabotage groups in the Baltic States and in the German North Sea ports to make sure of at least one reliable collaborator on all ships in those waters, who was to be carefully trained for his future work for the cause of the *Third Internationale*.

It was also due to his instructions that an attempt was made to establish a sabotage group in Danzig.

Leading officials of the Seamen's and Dockers' International belonging to these groups, among them the Norwegian national from Oslo

Arthur Samsing,

who lived for a considerable time in the Soviet Union, have meanwhile been arrested and have made detailed statements concerning their sabotage acts directed against the Reich on Wollweber's orders.

On the instructions of the Comintern, Wollweber also established bases on the Baltic islands of Dagö and Ösel. The collaborators procured on these islands were not, however, to act unless these islands were occupied by German troops or by the German Navy in the course of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The sabotage acts were then to be directed primarily against submarine bases, aerodromes and oil storage depots.

To what extent Bolshevism also attempted to display activity in the Reich is apparent from the fact that since March 1941 the Security Police (S.D.) in Upper Silesia and in the Government General have ascertained that Communist elements were being increasingly employed as leaders of Polish sabotage and terrorist organizations. Here, too, the organization of crimes of violence committed recently has been found to be characterized by Communist methods of operation as issued by the Comintern to all sections when the "War Theses" were drawn up at the VI and VII World Congresses in Moscow.

IV. Soviet Russian Espionage (Economic, Military and Political Intelligence Service) against the Reich.

1. OGPU methods against repatriated Germans.

When Russia, as a result of the frontier treaty between Germany and Russia on 29 September 1939, profited from the fruits of the German victory over Poland by a considerable increase of territory, she made use of the demarcation of the German and Russian spheres of interest in order to employ the re-established contiguity of frontiers with Germany for despatching innumerable espionage agents to the territory of her partner in the Non-Aggression Pact.

The magnanimous action of the Führer towards repatriation of Germans living on Russian territory was exploited in a despicable manner for these purposes.

When the Germans, in answer to the Führer's call, reported in large numbers for repatriation, the notorious OGPU, which since 3 February 1941 has become a part of the united People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, with the title of "People's Commissariat for State Security," made its appearance for the purpose of engaging many of these Germans by means of the most objectionable methods for espionage activity against the country to which, inspired by patriotic feelings, they were preparing to return. Although the OGPU scarcely achieved any practical success, because most of the people thus coerced for espionage work immediately reported this on reaching Germany, the fact nevertheless brands the methods of the OGPU and those in power in Soviet Russia.

In many cases the German candidates for repatriation were summoned by the OGPU, questioned for hours on end and threatened with exclusion from repatriation if they did not yield to the demands of the OGPU. Another favourite method was to inform the intending re-settlers that relatives remaining behind would be treated as hostages if they did not carry out the obligations which they had assumed under compulsion, or if they dared report the facts in Germany. Threats were made to them that the long arm of the OGPU would also reach them in Germany, a threat which did not fail to have its effect upon the individual re-settler in a small way. Not only men, but women too, were pressed in this shameless manner to assume obligations. From the hundreds of cases, a few are here cited which provide typical examples of the treatment meted out to Germans.

(a) During the course of the repatriation of the Germans from Bessarabia to the Reich, Frau Maria Baumann, of Czernowitz appeared, who stated that the Russian Secret Service had tried to press her for espionage purposes in Germany, as corroborated by the oaths of other witnesses. She had repeatedly been summoned to appear at superior offices of the OGPU, where every means was tried to persuade her to yield to the demands that she should undertake espionage work.

Being the mother of five children who were unprovided for (she is a widow), she was promised large sums of money and was told that even sums of 10,000 marks and more were of no consequence. She was to be entrusted with espionage work in Prague. She had already been provided with material and documents showing the extent of the specialized training.

(b) Elisabeth Kreutel, a married woman whose husband had a bandage business in Czernowitz, was also approached by the OGPU when her passport was examined. She was to carry on Russian espionage work in Saxony. She, too, brought important and instructive material to the knowledge of the German preventive authorities.

These proved individual cases might be supplemented by hundreds of others, for it has been ascertained that, according to a conservative estimate, the OGPU approached approximately 50 % of the re-settlers in order to force them to co-operate, either by coercive threats or by promises of large sums of money.

But the OGPU not only attempted, by using the most despicable means, to make these Germans traitors to their country; their agents even stooped in many cases to robbing these people, and to stealing their identification papers, money and valuables. In 16 cases proof is available that the theft of identification papers occurred in order to provide Russian espionage agents with them.

In six further cases there are strong suspicions that the OGPU murdered Germans for the purpose of employing their papers to smuggle agents unobtrusively into the Reich.

2. Soviet Russian diplomatic offices as centres of the economic, political and military intelligence service against the Reich, with the plain object of preparing for war.

Since the conclusion of the Pact, the Russian specialized espionage service has worked in a manner almost equivalent to open provocation. Surpassing its already

familiar ruthless methods, it now proceeded to make extensive use of the Russian diplomatic representations in the Reich and principally of the Russian Embassy in Berlin for the purposes of its reconnoitring activities. When some time ago the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Shkvartsev, was recalled and replaced by Ambassador Dekanozov, this change was the signal for a further intensification of espionage in the shape of political, economic and military intelligence activity. Dekanozov, one of Stalin's confidants, was the leader of the Intelligence Department of the N. K. V. D. (Russian People's Commissariat for Home Affairs), to which the OGPU is attached as a special espionage division. The task allotted to him by Moscow was that of obtaining admission to the authorities of the Reich by building up a network of trusted persons, and above all of obtaining reports upon the military strength and the plans of operation of the Reich. His faithful assistant was the member of the OGPU and so-called "Counsellor" Kobulov, who ruthlessly exploited his extritorial status to carry on intense activity in the sphere of espionage. Apart from gaining purely military information, the object of Russian espionage in the Reich was to find out the political plans of the Reich and by the establishment of a number of secret broadcasting stations in many places in Germany to prepare centres for issuing reports which were to pass on all information important to Russia by means of an intricate code system. Since 1940, therefore, large-scale preparations for mobilization in the field of espionage have been in progress, set in motion at a tremendous financial cost. (The German preventive service was able to intervene in time.)

The realization that the increasing pressure of Russian espionage was making itself felt principally in the eastern provinces of Germany — more particularly in the Government General and in the Protectorate — caused special attention to be paid to these territories which represented a source of danger. It was thus ascertained that Leonid Mokhov, a member of the Russian Consulate General in Prague, was in charge of a network of Russian espionage spread by the OGPU throughout the Protectorate. Former members of the Czech Legion, who had fought on the Polish side during the war against Poland and were for the most part supporters of the former Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and who had been in Russian captivity after the collapse of Poland, were coerced into joining the Russian espionage service and trained above all in operating secret

wireless transmitters. These people were sent into the Protectorate armed with forged identification papers where they began their activities under the direction of the above-mentioned Russian consular official, Mokhov. When the raid was carried out, more than 60 people belonging to this Russian espionage service were arrested and a dozen secret wireless transmitters, which were already functioning, were confiscated. (Note: This service worked completely independently of the illegal system established by the Comintern in the Protectorate. Vide No. II, 2.)

The Russian Secretary to the Embassy and OGPU official, Kobulov, had meanwhile not been inactive in Berlin. It is not without interest to quote here the declaration of a former Yugoslav diplomat who could not be accused of pro-German sympathies, namely, the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Vauhnik, who stated with regard to the assistant of the Russian Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Korniakov, that he concerned himself exclusively with the Intelligence Service and disbursed whatever money was necessary. It was the object of Kobulov, as the organizer, in collaboration with the Russian Military Attaché, Tupikov, and his assistant, Skorniakov, to establish secret transmitters for the communication of intelligence not only in the capital of the Reich but also in all the important towns throughout Greater Germany.

Only the two following instances will be quoted from the extensive material available concerning the activity of these gentlemen and of their collaborators:

a) Wietold Pakulat, a master baker in Mariampol in Lithuania, who was a member of the German Cultural Union in Lithuania and had relatives in the Reich, especially in Berlin, was one day summoned before the OGPU in Kovno. He was threatened with a charge of espionage. The fact that he was a member of the Cultural Union and had travelled from Lithuania to Germany on a number of occasions in order to visit his brother in Memel was sufficient reason for the OGPU to bring a charge of espionage against him. The frightened man was promised immunity from punishment only on condition that he declared himself prepared to be repatriated under the guise of a German refugee to Berlin and there to work for Russia according to definite instructions. He was sent into the Reich, whilst his wife and child were detained by the OGPU as hostages. On his departure, he was also threatened with the long arm

of the OGPU and told that if he turned traitor it would surely reach him in Berlin. In spite of this threat and although he was obliged to leave relatives behind in the power of the OGPU, this German realized where his duty lay and got into touch with the Security Police (SD). It was thus possible to thwart all the intentions of the Russians by means of this counter-stroke of which they remained in ignorance and, from the very outset, to keep a watch on their activities. In Berlin, Pakulat continually received instructions and orders from the Russian Embassy through an OGPU go-between. He was obliged to rent an apartment in which the OGPU set up a large secret transmitter. He was also obliged, acting on Russian orders, to take over a small hotel with a public bar, so as to have rooms ready and at the disposal of Russian agents and couriers passing through. He continually received instructions to make the acquaintance of skilled workmen in the armament industry in order to obtain inside information. The Russian espionage service deliberately aimed at preparation for war which included the marking down not only of objectives for future attacks from the air, but also of inconspicuous hiding-places in public squares and parks where secret material and objects required for acts of sabotage could be placed in readiness at an opportune moment.

In this connexion alone, the OGPU disbursed approximately RM 100,000 in order to get all the preparations under way of which only a short summary has been given above. With Pakulat's assistance the Russian Intelligence Service obtained the services of a German wireless operator from the firm of Siemens whom the Security Police (SD) placed at their disposal in order to thwart their plans. The Russian Intelligence Service counted with certainty on Pakulat's having meanwhile built up a reliable organization consisting of 60 Germans, who were not only to carry out extensive espionage but also to engage in subversive activity. The network, in accordance with the German counter-plot, was even allowed to spread as far as Königsberg, where a beginning was about to be made by marking on a map of the town factories executing orders of national importance.

b) Another case of despicable coercion of a German national has come to light in Berlin. This German national, who was born in Leningrad and whose name cannot for obvious reasons be divulged at present, finally returned to settle permanently in Berlin in 1936 after having previously paid a number of visits to Germany. He had married in

Russia under Russian law. There was one daughter by the marriage. As his wife, according to Russian law, remained a Russian subject, he was not allowed to bring her with him to Germany. In Berlin, he made continual efforts with the support of the German Foreign Office to obtain the necessary personal papers in order to have the Russian marriage recognized under German law. As he suffers from pulmonary consumption, and for this reason was particularly anxious to be reunited as soon as possible with his family, he saw no alternative but to return once more to Leningrad in order to take steps there to procure the documents and at last to get his wife and child to Germany. For this purpose he applied to the Russian Travel Bureau, "Intourist," and asked for the necessary permit to enter Russia. When the manager of this office, a Russian of the name of Shakhanov, discovered from his statements that this invalid was extremely anxious about his family, he began to play a game of despicable baseness with him. Shakhanov promised the sick man permission to travel to Leningrad on condition that he, a German, was prepared to betray his country. Shakhanov continued to harass the desperate man who was thereby almost driven to suicide. Shakhanov continued to play off his wife and child against him and let fall hints to the effect that they were hostages in the hands of the OGPU. The German national in question eventually made a declaration to the German preventive service. Acting on their instructions, he pretended to comply with the wishes of the OGPU agent, Shakhanov, and at his orders rented a large apartment which was likewise prepared for the installation of a secret wireless transmitter. In conclusion, it will suffice to mention the fact that Shakhanov and "Counsellor" Kobulov acted in close co-operation.

c) As the result of unremitting observation of the actions of the wireless specialist at the Russian Embassy in Berlin, who made his appearance in Danzig on various occasions, it was possible here, too, in the interests of preventive measures to arrange for the installation of a secret transmitter together with the necessary political and economic staff of confidential agents. Here, too, the timely declaration made by the Danzig citizens, the brothers Formella, who were to be pressed into the service of the OGPU, made it possible to frustrate the Russian espionage plans. This series of examples could be added to indefinitely, since the Russian Intelligence Service worked in the same way in all German towns which were considered of importance.

V. Frontier incidents.

In conclusion, it must also be stated that frontier incidents, which were a nightmare for the German population on the eastern frontiers, had continually been provoked by the Soviets, and they had increased since February 1941. The criminal shooting of German nationals and the continual firing of shots from the Russian side into German territory form the links in a continuous chain of evidence.

VI. Conclusion.

The whole of the activity of the Soviet Union directed against National Socialist Germany as illustrated by the examples quoted, which are culled from the abundant material available, shows to what extent subversive activity, sabotage, terrorism and espionage preparatory to war were carried on in the military, economic and political spheres.

These hostile activities did not decrease after the conclusion of the Consultation and Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 but, on the contrary, increased in scope and intensity.

(signed) Heydrich.